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Part one in a series by Alan Woods on the history of Bolshevism
The birth of Russian Marxism
THE ARTICLE, The Birth of Russian Marxism, is the first in a series by ALAN WOODS on the history of the Bolshevik Party. It explains how Plekhanou's Emancipation of Labour Group, "the embryo of a mighty mass revolutionary party... which, within the comparatively brief span of 34 years, was destined to lead the Russian workers and peasants to the conquest of power" was conceived and developed in the unfavourable conditions of backward Russia of the 1870s and 1880s. Future articles on the development of Bolshevism from these origins will appear in subsequent editions of the MIR.
ON THE 1 March 1881 the carriage of Tsar Alexander II was passing along the Catherine Canal in St Petersburg, when a young man suddenly threw what looked like a snowball. The explo sion that followed missed its mark, and the Tsar dismounted, unharmed to speak to some wounded Cossacks. At that moment, a second terrorist, Grinevetsky, rushed forward and with the words "It is too early to thank God", , threw another bomb at his feet. An hour and a half later, the Emperor of all the Russians was dead.
This act marked the culmination of one of the most remarkable periods in revolutionary history-a period in which a handful of dedicated and heroic young men and women took on the combined might of the Russian Tsarist state. Yet the very success of the terrorists in eliminating the figure at the apex of the hated autocracy simultaneously dealt the death-blow to the so-called party of the People's Will which had organised it.
The Narodniks
Trotsky explained the phenomenon of the Russian Narodniks ("populists", men of the people) as a consequence of the extreme belatedness of Russian capitalism. The decay of feudal society proceeded faster than the formation of the bourgeoisie.
Under these conditions, sections of the intelligentsia, especially the youth, broke away from the nobility,
bureaucracy and clergy and began to look for a way out of the social impasse. However, when they looked around for a point of support within society, they could not be attracted by
crude, backward and underdeveloped bourgeoisie, whilst the proletariat was still in its infancy, unorganised, politically untutored and small in numbers, particularly in comparison to the many millions of peasants who made up the dumb, oppressed and crushing majority of Russian society.
It was therefore understandable that the revolutionary intelligentsia should look to the "people" in the person of the peasantry as the main potential revolutionary force within society.
In the history of human ideas, there is an ascending line, but also a line of descent. Particularly in a period of economic, social and cultural crisis such as the period in which we live, ideas which long ago should have been consigned to the rubbish-bin of the past make their reappearance, inevitably under the disguise of something entirely novel. "Le mort saisit le vivant"-the dead lay their hands upon the living!
Thus, the "modern" theories of guerillaism repeat in caricatured form the antiquated ideas of the Russian Narodniks and terrorists. Like the latter, they try to find a base in the peasantry of the third world, in the lumpenproletariat, in fact, any class except the proletariat. Yet Marx and Engels explained that the only class capable of carrying through the socialist revolution and establishing a healthy workers' state leading to a classless society was the working class. And this is no accident. Only the working class, by virtue of its role in society and in production, especially large scale industrial production, possesses an instinctive socialist class consciousness. By contrast, the first principle of every other social class is the individualism of the property owner and exploiter of labour, both big and small.
Leaving aside the bourgeoisie, whose hostility to socialism is the first
21
condition of its existance, we have the middle class, including the peasantry. The latter is the social class least able to acquire a socialist consciousness. Its upper reaches, the wealthy peasant, lawyer, doctor, parliamentarian, stand close to the bourgeoise. However, even the poor landless peasant in Russia, although formally a rural proletarian, had a consciousness very far removed from his brothers in the cities. The one desire of the landless peasant was to possess land, ie to become transformed into a small proprietor.
Under certain conditionsparticularly in the present epoch— the mass of the poor peasants can be won over to the idea of collective ownership, as we saw in Spain in 1936, or as we see today in certain parts of India. But the prior condition for such a development is the revolutionary movement of the working class in the towns. However, in Russia, the working class came to power by mobilizing the poor peasants, not on the basis of socialist slogans, but on the basis of "land to the tillers!" This fact, in itself, shows how far the mass of Russian peasants stood from a socialist conciousness even in 1917.
Not accidently, the classical methods of struggle of the proletariat are based upon collective mass action: strikes, demonstrations, picket lines, the general strike. On the other hand, individual terrorism and "guerillaism" in all its multiplicity of forms, are the methods of the petty bourgeois, particularly the peasantry, but also the students, intellectuals and lumpen proletariat.
To the Narodniks, lacking in a sound theoretical basis, and setting out with a confused and amorphous concept of class relations ("'the people"), the Marxist argument of the leading role of the proletariat sounded like so muct hair-splitting. What did the working class have to do with it? Clearly Marr and Engels had not understood : se special situation in Russia!
The Narodkniks, in as much as ie. considered the role of the workers = the towns, regarded then = = aberration— as "peasants in factores
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MIR June 1985: Bolsh capable of playing only the role of auxiliaries to the peasantry in the revolution-precisely the opposite to the real relationship of revolutionary class forces, as subsequent events demonstrated.
"Going to
the people"
The Narodniks swore by "the people" in every other sentence. Yet they remained completely isolated from the peasant masses they idolised. In reality, the entire movement was concentrated into the hands of the intelligentsia: "The Populists' worship of the peasant and his commune was but the mirror image," wrote Trotsky, "of the grandiose pretentions of the 'intellectual proletariat' to the role of chief, if not indeed sole, instrument of progress. The whole history of the Russian intelligentsia develops between these two poles of pride and selfabregation-which are the short and long shadows of its social weakness." (The Young Lenin p. 25, my emphasis, AW.)
But this social weakness of the intelligentsia merely reflected the underdeveloped state of class relations in Russian society. The rapid development of industry and the creation of a powerful urban working class which was to be brought about by a massive influx of foreign capital in the 1890s was still the music of an apparently remote future. Thrust back upon their own resources, the revolutionary intelligentsia sought salvation in the theory of a special "Russian road to socialism", , based upon the element of common ownership which existed in the village commune or "mir"
The emancipation of the serf in 1861 had been brought about by the fear of a social explosion after the disastrous Crimean War (1853-56), which like the later war with Japan, revealed the bankruptcy of the Tsarist regime in the form of a humiliating military defeat. But the Edict of Emancipation solved none of the problems and, indeed, made the lot of the mass of the peasants considerably worse.
The landlords naturally made off with the best plots of land, leaving the most barren areas to the peasants. Strategic points such as water and mills were usually in the hands of the landlords who forced the peasants to pay for access. Worse still, the "free" peasants were legally tied to the "mir" which had collective responsibility for collecting taxes. No peasant could leave the "mir" without permission. Freedom of movement was hampered by the system of internal passports. The village commune, in effect, was transformed into "the lowest rung of the local police system." (see Pares: A
History of Russia p 404).
In the years after 1861, the peasantry, hemmed in by repressive legislation on "poverty lots" and impoverished by the weight of debt, staged a series of desperate local uprisings. But the peasantry, throughout history, has always been incapable of playing an independent role in society. Capable of great revolutionary courage and sacrifice, its efforts to shake off the rule of the oppressor have only succeeded where leadership of the revolutionary movement has been taken up by a stronger, more homogeneous and conscious class based in the towns. In the absence of this factor, the peasant "jacqueries", , from the middle ages onwards, have inevitably suffered the cruellest defeats, as a result of the scattered nature of the peasantry, its lack of social cohesion and class consciousness.
In Russia, where capitalist forms of production were still at the embryonic phase, no such revolutionary class existed in the towns. Yet the class; or more accurately caste, of largely impoverished students and intellectuals, the "raznochintsy" ("those without rank") or "intellectual proletariat" proved exceptionally sensitive to the subterranean mood of discontent which lay deep within the recesses of Russian life. Years later, the terrorist Myshkin dęclared at his trial that: •The movement of the intelligentsia was not artificially created, but was the echo of popular unrest." (quoted in Trotsky's The Young Lenin). As always, the intelligentsia, whose ability to play an independent social role is no greater than the peasantry, nevertheless can act as quite an accurate barometer of the moods and tensions developing within society.
In 1861, the very year of the Emancipation, the great Russian democratic writer Alexander Herzen wrote from exile in London urging the youth of Russia in the pages of his journal Kolokol (The Bell) to go "to the people!" The arrest of prominent publicists like Chernyshevesky (whose writings were influenced by Marx and who had a big impact on Lenin and his generation) and Dimitri Pisarev demonstrated the impossiblity of peaceful liberal reform. By the end of the decade of the 1860's, the basis of a mass revolutionary movement of populist youth had been laid.
"Land and freedom"
With the wisdom of hindsight it is a simple task to expose the theoretical weakness of Narodism. Yet this was an inevitable stage in the historically progressive movement of the youth, breaking away from liberalism and
22
striving with might and main to find a road to the socialist revolution. How superior were these courageous attempts to transform society compared to all the wisdom of the "modern" reformist pharisees who have long ago given up all ideas of fighting to change society!
In a striking passage, graphically recaptures the these youthful pioneers:
"Young men and women, most of them former students numbering about a thousand in all, carried socialist propaganda to all corners of the country, especially to the lower reaches of the Volga, where they sought the legacy of Pugachov* and Razin*. This movement, remarkable in its scope and youthful idealism, the true cradle of the Russian revolution, was distinguished-as is proper to a cradle-by extreme naivete. The propagandists had neither a guiding organisation nor a clear programme; they had no conspiratorial experience. And why should they have? These young people, having broken with their families and schools, without profession, personal ties, or obligations, and without fear either of earthly or heavenly powers, seemed to themselves the living crystalisation of a popular uprising. A constitution? Parliamentarianism? Political liberty? No, they would not be swerved from the path by these western decoys. What they wanted was a complete revolution, without abridgement or intermediate stages"
(Trotsky op cit, Page 28)
Trotsky spirit of
* Emilian Pugachov: A Don Cossack, Pugachou led a great uprising of the Cossacks and serfs against the gentry in 1773, in the reign of Catherine the Great. The rebellion initially met with success, with the mass seizure of land and the capture of a string of imperial fortresses. The rebels took Kazan and could have taken Moscow but, despite riots which broke out in a number of towns, the peasant rebellion proved incapable of linking up with the ur ban masses against the common enemythe gentry and the autocracy. Although the rebels proclaimed the abolition of serfdom, they lacked a coherant political programme capable of creating a broad revolutionary movement of the masses. This fatal weakness, plus localist tendencies, lack of organisation and discipline, eventually undermined the revolt. The rebellion disintegrated and Pugachou was executed in Moscow in January 1775.
* Stepan Razin: Another Cossack rebel who sailed up the Volga at the head of a pirate fleet in 1670 calling on the peasants to rise. Betrayed by the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, Razin was captured and sent to Moscow where he was executed on 6 June. 1671.
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To these courageous and dedicated youth, the words uttered by Herzen made an indelible impression: "Go to the people... That is our place. Demonstrate... that from among you will'emerge not new bureaucrats, but soldiers of the Russian people"
In the summer of 1874, hundreds of young people from upper or middleclass backgrounds went out to the villages, burning with the idea of rousing the peasantry to revolution. Pavel Axelrod, one of the future founders of Russian Marxism, recalls the radical break which these young revolutionaries had made with their class:
"Whoever wished to work for the people had to give up university, renounce his privileged condition, and his family, turn his back even upon science and art. They had to cut all the bonds which linked them to the highest social classes, burn their bridges behind them. In one word, they had to voluntarily forget about any possible road of retreat. The propagandist, so to speak, had to eftect a complete transtormation of his inner essence, so that he would feel at one with the lower strata of the people, not only ideologically, but also in his habitual everyday behaviour". • (From Axelrod: The Working Class and the Revolutionary Movement in Russia).
Unfortunately, this admirable revolutionary spirit was founded upon theories which were fundamentally unsound. The mystical idea of a "special Russian road to socialism" which could somehow leap from feudal barbarism to a classless society, skipping the phase of capitalism, was the source of an endless series of errors and tragedies.
A false theory inevitably leads to a disaster in practice. In reality, the Narodniks were motivated by revolutionary voluntarism-the idea that the success of the revolution can be guaranteed by the iron will and determination of a small group of dedicated men and women. The subjective factor, of course, is decisive in human history. Karl Marx explained that men and women make their own history, but added that "they do not make it outside of the context of social and economic relationships established independently of their will"
The attempts of the Narodnik theoreticians to establish a "special historical path" for Russia, different from that of Western Europe inevitably led them down the road of philosophical idealism and a mystical
'he theoretics confusion of Bakunin—a reflection of the very underdeveloped and incohate class relations in Russia-found a ready audiance among the Narodniks, seeking an ideological justification for
George Plekhanov and Pavel Axeirod - two of Group.
their vague revolutionary aspirations.
Standing reality on its head, Bakunin portrayed the "mir"-the basic unit of the Tsarist regime in the village-as the enemy of the state. All that was necessary was for the revolutionaries to go to the village and rouse the "instinctively revolutionary" Russian peasants against the state and the problem would be solved, without recourse to "politics" or any particular form of party organisation. The task was not to fight for democratic demands (since democracy also represented a form of state and therefore another expression of tyranny) but to overthrow the state 'in general" and replace it with a voluntary federation of local communities, based on the "mir", purged of its reactionary features.
Unfortunately, the contradictory elements of this theory rapidly became evident when the Narodnik youth attempted to put it into practice. The revolutionary exhortations of the students were met with sullen suspicion or outright hostility by the peasants, who frequently handed over the newcomers to the authorities. The movement of "going to the people" was swiftly broken by a wave of arrests-more than 700 in 1874 alone. It was an expensive defeat. But the heroic and spirited speeches of defiance hurled from the dock by the arrested revolutionists served to kindle a new movement which began almost immediately.
As a crowning paradox, despite all the prejudice of the Narodnik theoreticians, almost the only area where the revolutionary appeals got an echo was among the despised "town peasants" as they called the lactory workers. Like the modern guerillas, the supporters of Zemlya y Volya ('Land and Freedom") adopted the policy of taking revolutionary workers out of the factories and sending them to the countryside. Plekhanov, before he
23
became a Marxist, participated in this kind of activity and was able to see the consequences:
''The factory worker who has worked in the city for several years," he wrote, "feels ill at ease in the country and goes back to it reluctantly... Rural customs and institutions become unendurable for a person whose personality has begun evolving a little". (Quoted in Dan's Origins of Bolshevism, page 162).
"These were experienced people, sincerely devoted to and profoundly imbued with Populist views. But their attempts to set themselves up in the countryside led to nothing. After roving about the villages with the intention of looking for a suitable place to settle down (at which some of them were taken to be foreigners), they shrugged their shoulders at the whole business and finished by returning to Saratov where they established contacts among the local workers. No matter how astounded we were by this alienation from the 'people' of its urban children, the fact was evident, and we had to abandon the idea of involving workes in a purely peasant business." (Ibid p 162-163).
Thus, by the pressure of reality, sections of the Narodniks were forced to come face to face for the first time with the "worker question" which, expelled by Bakuninist theories by the front door, persistently flew back through the window. Even at this very early period, the Russian working class, despite the extreme smallness of its numbers, was beginning to set its stamp upon the revolutionary movement.
Beginnings of the workers' movement
While the Narodnik intelligentsia wrestled with the theoretical problems of the future revolution, the first stir-
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rings of class consciousness were emerging in the urban centres. Zaslavsky's Southern Russian Workers' Union arose out of a small workers' discussion circle and gradually spread from Odessa to other industrial centres in the south. The union, which was influenced by the ideas of the First International, was broken up by arrests in December 1875 after only a brief existence and its founder, Zaslavsky ended his life in prison.
A more substantial development was the Northern Union of Russian Workers set up illegally in the Autumn of 1877 under the leadership of Stepan Nikolaevich Khalturin, the son of a peasant and a joiner by trade. This group had about 200 hard-core members and had followers in almost every key working class district of Saint Petersburg, mainly among the most advanced sections of the metalworkers. But within a month of the appearance of the first issue of its illegal journal Rabochaya Zarya (The Workers' Dawn) the police had smashed the printshop and the bulk of the membership was swept away by a wave of arrests, hard labour, imprisonment and exile.
Significant though these attempts were, they really only represented an anticipation of things to come. Ideologically the worker revolutionaires were still predominately under the influenca of Narodnism. The numbers these early organisations embraced were very small, involving only handfuls of the most advanced workers. Nevertheless, they showed the way, establishing a tradition of the independent organisation of the working class upon which later generations could build. They count among the many "nameless heroes"-courageous and self-sacrificing men and women by whose tireless and anonymous labour a firm base was laid for the future mighty achievements of their class.
In the meantime, the rennants of the Narodnik movement were attempting to regroup their forces in the towns under the banner of Zemiya y Volya.
On the 6 December 1876, an illegal demonstration of anything up to 500—mainly students-assembled on the steps of Kazan Cathedral, with cries of "land and freedom" and "long live the socialist revolution!" The demonstration was addressed by a young student called George Plekhanov whose revolutionary appeal led to the beginning of years of exile and underground life.
The following year, a young girl, Vera Zasulich, who had been involved in the revolutionary movement since she was 16, fired a shot at the notorious Petersburg police chief,
June 1985: Bolshevism Part 1
Trepor which seriously wounded him, and then handed herself over to the police. Surprisingly, the jury issued a verdict of not guilty in March 1878. The assassination attempt was a clear indication of the way in which after the failure of "going to the people", a section of the Narodniks was turning in the direction of individual terrorism.
"The People's Will"
The frustrated attempts to provoke a mass movement of the peasantry by means of propaganda gave rise to a new theory whereby Bakuninism was stood upon its head. From "denying politics" and especially political organisation, a section of the narodniks effected a 180° turn and set up a secret, highly centralised terrorist organisation-the Narodnaya Volya, or "People's Will"-designed to provoke a revolutionary movement of the masses by means of "propaganda of the deed"
The latest military humiliation of Tsarist Russia in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) revealed anew the bankruptcy of the regime and gave fresh heart to the opposition. The leaders of Narodnaya Volya were determined to wage a war against the autocracy in a kind of terrorist single combat which would encourage "from above" the flame of revolt.
The adoption of the new tactics caused an open split in the movement, between the terrorists and the followers of Lavrov who argued in favour of a prolonged period of preparation and propaganda among the masses. In practice, the latter trend was moving away from revolutionism, advocating the politics of "small deeds" and a "little by little" gradualist approach. The right-wing of Narodnism was becoming indistinguishable from Liberalism, while its more radical section prepared to stake everything on the force of the bullet and the "revolutionary chemistry" of nitro-glycerine.
Towards the end of 1878 and the beginning of 1879, a wave of labour unrest swept through St Petersburg. The workers went to ask help from "the students". The possibility of linking the revolutionary movement with the working class was staring the Narodniks in the face. In point of fact, a "workers' section" of Zemlya y Volya was set up, with Plekhanov at its head. But the attentions of the main currents were elsewhereconcentrated upon the feverish attempt to bring down the autocracy by means of an organised campaign of terror.
In the recent period, attempts have been made by the modern terrorists to
24
distinguish themselves from their Russian forebears. The Narodnik terrorists, it is asserted, believed in individual terrorism, substituting themselves for the movement of the masses, whereas the modern proponents of "armed struggle" or "urban guerillaism" see themselves only as an armed wing of the mass strug gle, whose purpose is to detonate the masses into action.
Yet the supporters of Norodnaya Volya never claimed to be acting as a self-sufficient movement. Their stated objective was to initiate a mass movement, based on the peasantry, which would overthrow the state and institute socialism. Their aim was also supposed to be the "detonation" of the mass movement by giving a courageous example.
Yet politics has a logic of its own. All the appeals of the Narodnaya Volya in the name of the masses, merely served as a smokescreen to reveal a deepseated distrust in the revolutionary capacity of those same masses. The arguments advanced more than a century ago in Russia to justify terrorism
arge sents or gly angeria to the
in Ireland, the Middle East and South Africa: "we are in favour of the mass movement, but the state is too strong," and so on and so forth. Thus, the terrorist Morozov affirmed:
"Observing contemporary social life in Russia the conclusion is reached that, because of the arbitrary conduct and violence of the government, no activity at all is possible on behalf of the people. Neither freedom of expression, nor freedom of the press exists to work by means of persuasion. In consequence, for every vanguard activist it is necessary, first and foremost, to put an end to the present system of government, and to struggle against it there is no other means than to do it with arms in hand. As a conse quence, we will fight against it in the style of William Tell, until we reach the moment when we win free institutions under which it will be possible for us to discuss without obstacles in the press and in public meetings all the political and social questions, and decide upon them by means of the free representation of the people." (My emphasis A Woods).
The allegedly "new" and "modern" theories of urban guerrillaism only repeat in caricature form the old pre Marxist ideas of the Russian terrorists. It is quite ironic that these peo ple ario tennists, lay de moto be
, have not the vaguest idea that Russian Marxism was born out of an implacable struggle against individual terrorism.
The Russian Marxists scornfully
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described the terrorist as "a Liberal
with a bomb." The Liberal fathers
spoke in the name of "the People", , but
considered the latter too ignorant to
be trusted with the responsible work
of reforming society. Their role was to
be reduced to passively casting a vote
every few years and looking on while
the Liberals in Parliament got on with
their business.
The sons and daughters of the
Liberals had nothing but contempt for
Parliament. They stood for the Revolu-
tion, and, of course, 'the People." Except that the latter, in their ignorance,
were unable to understand them. Therefore, they would resort to the "revolutionary chemistry" of the bomb and the revolver. But, just as before, the role of the masses was reduced to that of passive spectators.
The worst thing about the terrorist policy is that it is most harmful to the cause of the masses precisely when it succeeds. Marxism sees the revolutionary transformation of society as a conscious act carried out by the working class. That which is progressive is that which serves to raise the consciousness of the workers of their own strength. That which is reactionary is that which tends to lower the workers' own opinion of their role. From this point of view, the role of individual terrorism is a wholly reactionary one.
What conclusions are the workers supposed to draw from a spectacularly successful act of individual terrorism? Only this: that it is possible to attain their ends without any necessity for the long and arduous preparatory work of organising trade unions, participating in strikes and other mass actions, of agitation, propaganda and educational work. All that would be seen as an unnecessary diversion, when all that is needed is to get hold of a bomb and a gun and "head for the hills".
The experience of terrorism and guerrillaism in Latin America over the period of the sixties and seventies merely repeats, with a delay of nearly a century, the mistakes of the Russian Narodniks.
A section of the old Zemiya y Volya movement attempted to resist the trend towards terrorism, but was swept aside. An attempt to reach a compromise at the Voronezh congress of June 1879 failed to stop the split which finally took place in October of that year with a formal agreement of both sides to dissolve the organisation. The funds were divided and both sides agreed not to use the old name. The terrorist faction adopted the name of Narodnaya Volya ('The People's Will"), while the remnants of the oldschool "village" Narodniks took the name of the Cherny Peredel ("'Black
Redistribution"), echoing the old Narodnik idea of an agrarian revolution. It was from this latter organisation, led by Plekhanov, that the first forces of Russian Marxism were to emerge,
Liberals recoil
The prospects for Plekhanov's tendency could hardly have been more bleak. The old tactic of "going to the people" was played out. The peasants were no more receptive to the blandishments of the Narodniks than before. Many old Narodniks finally gave up hope and "voted with their feet" , returning to a more convivial existence in the towns.
Probably influenced by his earlier experience as head of the "workers' sections" , Plekhanov proposed to the members of the Cherny Peredel that they should conduct agitation among the factory workers. Plekhanov sought links with his former worker contacts, among them Stepan Khalturin of the Northern Union of Russian Workers. But the tide was running strongly in favour of terrorism even among the advanced workers. Khalturin himself participated, in February 1880, in an attempt against the life of the Tsar. The supporters of Cherny Peredel were utterly isolated. The final blow came in January 1880 when, shortly after the appearance of the first issue of the group's journal, the police descended on the underground printshop and mopped up practically the whole organisation in Russia. The future of the non-terrorist trend in Narodnism, as Trotsky later observed, could not be an independent phenomenon, but only a brief and shadowy transition towards Marxism.
On the other side of the divide, the supporters of Narodnaya Volya appeared to be making spectacular gains. It seems incredible how an organisation of no more than a few hundred men and women could keep the Tsar a virtual prisoner in his own palace.
The very successes of the terrorists, however, contained the seeds of their own disintegration. The assassination of the Tsar in 1881 unleashed a reign of repression in which the terror of the individual against ministers and policemen gave way to the terror of the entire state apparatus against the revolutionary movement in general.
The new Procurator General, the minister Pobedonostsev promisea a reign of "iron and blood" to wipe out the terrorists." A series of draconic laws gave the government sweeping new powers of arrest, censorship and deportation, which artected not only the revolutionaries, but even the most moderate Liberal tendencies. National
25
oppression was stepped up, with the
suppression of all publications in non-
Russian languages. Laws were passed
to strengthen the grip of the landlord
on his peasants. A wave of reaction
swept through the schools and univer-
sities, designed to crush all forms of independent thought and break the rebellious spirit of the youth.
Yet contrary to the expectations of the terrorists, there was no mass uprising, no general movement of opposition. Very soon, all the hopes born of a generation of self-sacrificing heroism were reduced to ashes.
The new period of reaction intensified the crisis of Narodnism. A whole stratum of educated and well-to-do Narodnik leaders reacted to the violence of the reaction by hastily repudiating the revolutionary fight against autocracy. In place of this, the "Hannibals of Liberalism" as Lenin scornfully styled them, argued in favour of peaceful reform: the establishment of village co-operatives and cultural activities "among the people", ', or "community politics", , as the present-day Liberals have it. This mean-spirited policy of "small deeds"— which closely resembles the "little by little" gradualism of the Fabians-was championed by such prominent Narodnik theorists as VP Vorontsev (pen-name VV) and NF Danielson ("Nikolaya") against whom many of Plekhanov's earliest (and best) polemics were written.
The terrorist wing of Narodnism was swiftly decimated by a wave of arrests. By 1882, its centre liquidated and its leaders in gaol, the Narodnik movement broke up into a thousand fragments.
Yet in the hour when the death-knell of the old Narodnism was sounding, a new movement was rapidly gaining ground in the rest of Europe, and a new class balance of forces was emerging in backward Russia itself.
Crisis of
Narodnik ideology
The 1880s saw the decisive victory of the ideas of Marxism in the European labour movement. The presentday Labour leaders would like to forget the fact that the Socialist International at its inception inscribed upon its banner the programme of Marxism.
For years, the ideas of Marx and Engels (albeit in an incomplete and vulgarised form) had been familar to Russian revolutionaries. Marx, and especially Engels, had enguaged in polemics with the theoreticians of Narodnism. But Marxis bad seve: had a sizable following. Its decial of = dividual terrorism. its rejectios si e
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special "Russian road to Socialism" and of the alledged leading role of the peasantry in the revolution was too much for revolutionary youth to swallow. In comparison with Bakunin's "propaganda of the deed" the idea that Russia would have to pass through the painful school of capitalism smacked of passivity and defeatism.
Like the modern day "guerillaists" the Narodniks did not understand Marx and Engels insistence on the central role of the proletariat in the socialist transformation of society. There was, however, at least good reason for the theoretical confusion of the Russian Narodniks. Capitalist industry was only just in its infancy. The industrial working class was numerically weak and immature, with one foot still in the village. Above all, the problem of carrying out the socialist revolution in a backward, semi-colonial peasant country was a new one. They had no October revolution behind them, no model and no precedent to fall back on. Despite the marvellous insights in the writings of Marx and Engels, particularly in the writings of Engels' old age, such as the brilliant article "On Social Relations in Russia" , the question had not been completely worked out from a theoretical point of view. Not until the period of 1904-1905, did Trotsky finally solve the problem by his epochmaking theory of the Permanent Revolution.
The tragedy of Narodnism was that it had set itself the task of bringing about the Socialist Revolution before the objective social and economic conditions for it had matured. But no effort of the will, no amount of courage and determination can make any difference where historical conditions are unfavourable. The subjective factoreven in the person of a single individual-can sometimes be decisive. Such was the case with Lenin and Trotsky in 1917. But long before this favourable juncture came to pass, the leaders of Russian Marxism had spent many long and fruitless years and decades in tiny groups, isolated from the mainstream of society, with no immediate prospect for success.
The "voluntarist" methods of Narodnism were an attempt to short circuit the historical process. If history was too slow, then it had to be given a shove by the subjective factor. If the masses were too steeped in ignorance to realise what was good for them, then their backwardness must be made up for by the shining example of a small, highly organised, tightly disciplined group of revolutionaries. From every point of view, the young members of the Narodnaya Volya
: MIR
organisation were exemplary fighters. Courageous, disciplined and highly moral in their personal lives, they were like knights in shining armour come to rescue the benighted masses from their oppressors. Despite the utopian nature of their theories, these selfsacrificing men and women contrast favourably with the modern school of terrorism whose degenerate, cynical and barbarous methods stink in the nostrils of the working class.
Alas! The way to Hell is paved with good intentions. The attempt to cheat history by means of the "subjective factor" led to the destruction of a generation of dedicated revolutionary youth. Narodnism had ended in a complete impasse. The way out was shown by the Marxist tendency, led by George Valentinovich Plekhanov, who later formed the group for the Emancipation of Russian Labour.
The old generation of Narodniks had a barely conceiled disdain for theory. Insofar as they resorted to ideological argument, it was really as an afterthought, to justify the practical twists and turns of the movement. In turn they had put forward the idea of the central role of the peasantry, of Russia's alleged "special historical mission", , Pan Slavism, and terrorism. Having broken their heads against a solid wall, the ideologists of Narodnism, instead of honestly admitting their mistakes and attempting to work out an alternative strategy and tactic, proceeded to re-affirm the old bankrupt ideas, and, in so doing, sank ever deeper into a morass of confusion.
The first act of the new trend represented by Plekhanov and a tiny handful of collaborators, was to build firm foundations for the future on the basis of correct ideas, theory, tactics and strategy. This was the great contribution of Plekhanov, without which the future development of Bolshevism would have been unthinkable.
The birth of
Russian Marxism
Though still, in his own words, "a Narodnik to the fingertips" Plekhanov sought an answer to the problems posed by the crisis of Narodnik ideology in a serious study of the works of Marx and Engels. Forced to flee abroad in January 1880, he had met and dicussed with French and German Marxists then engaged in a fierce ideological struggle with the anarchists. This encounter with the European labour movement was a decisive turning-point in Plekhanov's development.
In the Russian underground, only a few works of Marx and Engels had
been available, mainly on economic questions. Like others of his generation, Plekhanov was acquainted with the Marx of Capital, which the Tsarist censors regarded as too difficult and "academic" to be dangerous. It is doubtful whether the censors themselves could understand it, so how, they thought, could the workers make head or tail of it? Now, at last, Plekhanov had access to the arsenal of Marxist thought, its living method, the philosophy of dialectical materialism. It was a revelation to him.
Plekhanov's study of Marxist philosophy, the writings on the class struggle and the materialist conception of history cast a whole new light. on the perspectives for the revolution in Russia. One by one, the old ideas of terrorism, anarchism and Narodnism crumbled under the onslaught of Marxist criticism. He later summed up the experience:
"Anyone who did not live through those times with us can hardly imagine the eagerness with which we threw ourselves into the study of Social Democratic literature, amidst which the works of the German theoreticians naturally occupied the first place. And the more closely we became acquainted with Social Democratic literature, the more we became aware of the weak points of our earlier views. the more we became convinced of the correctness of our own revolutionar! development... The theories of Marx. like Ariadne's thread, led us forth from the labyrinth of contradictions with which our minds were stuffed, under the influence of Bakunin."
Freed, for a time, from the pressures of direct participation in the revolutionary struggle in Russia, Plekhanov and the others, had the enormous advantage of access to literature which was unobtainable there. Piekhanov recalls:
"Personally, I can say of myself that the reading of the Communist Manifesto marks an epoch in my life. I was inspired by the Manifesto and there and then decided to translate it into Russian."
Thus began the Herculean work of translating, popularising and generally broadcasting the works of Marx and Engels within the Russian revolutionary movement. This was the embryonic phase of Russian Marxism. But before striking out decisively towards the creation of a new party, they first had to settle accounts with the old.
Naturally enough for men and women who had only recently broken with Narodnism, Plekhanov's group at first looked back towards the old Narodnaya Volya Party in the hope of
[page 28]
convincing their former comrades. No doubt there was an element in the
group which still entertained illusions on this score. People like Vera Lasulich, whose history has already been mentioned; Axelrod, who had been one of the organisers of the Narodnik organisation in Kiev; Lev G. Deitch who had been an active Narodnik propagandist in the South since the late seventies, and had made a daring escape from Kiev prison in 1878. Such people as these would not lightly break with the movement to which they had dedicated their lives.
The experience had to be gone through. But in any event, Plekhanov understood that the cadres of the future Russian Marxist workers' party could not drop from the clouds. Narodnaya Volya represented the tradition of a whole generation of struggle against Tsarism. Such a movement, steeped in the blood of countless revolutionary martyrs, could not be light-mindedly written off.
Precisely because of its traditions, the Narodnik movement, even in the period of its degeneration, still attracted many of the young men and women, confusedly seeking a road to social revolution. Such a man was Alexander Ulyanov, Lenin's brother, executed for his part in a plot against the life of Alexander III in 1887. Lenin himself had Narodnik sympathies and almost certainly began his political life as a Narodnaya Volya supporter. To save such people as this from futile terrorist gestures was the first duty of the Russian Marxists.
The group's attempts to find a road to the revolutionary youth in Russia soon came up against a stone wall of obstacles erected by the right-wing Narodnik leaders who controlled the party press. The editors of Vestnik Narodnoi Voli refused even to print Plekhanov's work Socialism and the Political Struggle, his pioneering work directed against anarchism.
Despite the smallness of its forces, Plekhanov's group caused alarm in the leading Narodnik cricles, which immediately tried to stifle the voice of Marxism by bureaucratic means. The impossibility of a reconciliation was now clear to everyone, and in September 1883 the Marxists formed the Group for the Emancipation of Russian Labour. The break with the past was now complete.
The Emancipation
Labour group
= changing their programme now = triased on a struggle against ab- = 2c the organisation of the he sirong class as a separate
party with a definitely Social
Democratic programme, the former
members of the 'Black Redistribution'
group will now form a new group-the 'Emancipation of Labour' and finally
break with the old anarchist trends."
These words at the end of the announcement of the establishment of a "Library of Contemporary Socialism" marks the end of one historical period and the commencement of a new era. The handful of members of the new group must have experienced a fateful sense of finality on reading them. It was a courageous and irrevocable step, which initially spelled complete isolation from the rest of the revolutionary movement, from which they were now self-proclaimed outcasts.
Ahead of them lay many years of hard and lonely struggle in the shadow of tedious anonymity. It takes a peculiar kind of courage for a small minority to take a conscious decision to struggle against the stream, isolated from the masses, in harsh conditions of exile, with only the slenderest resources and against apparently overwhelming odds. Not for the last time, the forces of Russian Marxism were reduced to the role of "a voice crying in the wilderness"
The only thing that sustained them was their confidence in the ideas, theory and perspectives. This, in spite of the fact that their ideas appeared to fly in the face of reality. The workers' movement in Russia was still in its early stages. True, there was the beginnings of a strike movement, but that fell quite outside the scope of the socialists. Such workers' groups that existed were still dominated by Narodnik ideas. The still feeble voice of the "Emancipation of Labour Group" was not heard in the factories. Even the students, still under the spell of anarchist and terrorist tendencies, proved difficult enough to reach.
In a letter to Axelrod written as late as March 1889, Plekharov wrote: "Everyone (both 'liberals'
'socialists') unanimously say that the young people will not even listen to those who speak out against terrorism. In view of this we will have to be careful"
As soon as it was formed, the Emancipation of Labour Group was faced with sharp attacks from all sides for its alleged 'betrayal" of "revolutionary" Narodnism. On the other hand, they derived moral comfort from the solid achievements of European Social Democracy. The forces of Russian Marxism were small, but they formed a detachment of a mighty proletarian army, numbering millions in Germany, France, Belgium. Here was a living proof of the superiority of Marxism, not in the language of
27
Capital but in the statisties of trad: union memberships, party branches votes and Parliamentary factions
In their isolation from the more ment in Russia, the Emancipation o: Labour Group members instinctively drew closer to the mighty parties of the Socialist International. Plekhanor and his comrades wrote for its press spoke at its congresses-especial! those of the German party, the part! of Marx, Engels, Liebknecht arc Bebel.
Even the support of the Europear Social Democracy was, however, less than wholehearted. For years its leaders had entertained friendly relations with Narodnik leaders like Lavrov. Privately, the Socia: Democratic leaders looked askance at what appeared to be no more than an eccentric sectarian splinter group. The sharpness of Plekhanov's polemics against internationally known figures of the Narodnik establishment caused consternation.
"To tell the truth" • wrote Plekhanov, "our struggle against the Bakunists sometimes gave rise to fears even among the Western Social Democrats. They considered it inopportune. They were afraid that our propaganda, by causing a split in the revolutionary party, would weaken the energy of the struggle against the government."
Already based on powerful parties with mass support, in their hearts the Western labour leaders were sceptical about the possibilities for creating a revolutionary Marxist workers' party in Russia. Outwardly respectful of Plekhanov and his group, they private. ly scratched their heads in bewilderment. What was the point of all these endless disputes about obscure points of theory? Was it really necessary to split over such questions? Why can't these Russians get their act together?
Their sceptical attitude seemed to be justified by the smallness of the group and the slowness of its progress. By comparison, the Narodniks had a much bigger organisation, more resources and infinitely greater influence inside and outside Russia.
Yet, in reality, the seemingly in. significant group of Plekhanov represented the embryo of a mighty mass revolutionary party-a party which, within the comparatively brief span of 34 years, was destined to lead the Russian workers and peasants to the conquest of power and the establishment of the first democratic workers' state in history.
To be continued MIR
future
[page 29]
MIR June 1985: Econo
The American chickens
come home to roost
THIS COLUMN in the last issue of MIR
(Winter 1985) predicted that the
economic boom in the USA would
come to a shuddering stop. The 1984
growth rate of nearly seven per cent
had been entirely based on ever expanding military expenditure, financed by borrowing from abroad and an unprecedented budget deficit.
While service industries had
mushroomed from the resulting consumer boom, employing mostly parttime labour at poverty wage levels, US manufacturing had not been able to take advantage of demand. Manufacturing production had only risen by a paltry two per cent in 1984 while foreign imports, mainly from Japan, had surged in. Therefore this column argued that the US boom was a fictitious one, not based on real increases in the output and employment of the productive sectors of the economy. No economy can continue to grow indefinitely when financed just by paper dollars. A sharp downturn could only be a short time away.
However, the Reagan administration and its economic supporters, both in the USA and Europe, continued to claim that economic prosperity was here to stay. Reagan even had the nerve to chide the European political leaders for the failure of their economies to expand at the same rate as the 'free market' of the USA.
But the truth will out, as they say. The Reagan government had forecast a substantial four per cent rise in Gross National Product for 1985. But the trend at the end of the first quarter of 1985 shows only a rise of 1.3 per cent per annum. Manufacturing, agriculture and mining are in complete stagnation, while imports continue to rise -Japan had a trade surplus with the USA of a staggering $44 billion in 1984.
The American government and big business has borrowed so much to pay for these imports that the US nation became a net debtor ie. it borrowed more than it lent for the first time in its history.
The USA had only been able to borrow so much because it was willing to pay high interest for borrowing dollars to pay for imports. This had held up the value of the dollar and made it possible to pay for imports with greenbacks. But a high value dollar made it impossible for US manufacturers to compete with foreign importers or sell goods abroad. And high interest rates stifled investment. The boom could not last.
Now that overall production has slumped, the US economic situation is
Econom ic
dramatically reversing. The dollar is falling back against other currencies. This will drive up the domestic price of imports. The government will either have to borrow even more money to pay for goods or more likely make savage cuts in government spending and raise taxes. The USA is heading for low growth, rising unemployment as well as inflation in 1985 - 6.
The strength of a modern capitalist economy depends on the health of its industrial base. And the truth is that, relatively, the USA has declined as an industrial power over the past 25 years. In the early 1950s the USA produced one-third of the world's total manufacturing output - it was truly the workshop and laboratory of the world. Its output was greater than the whole of Europe combined, generating a large manufacturing trade surplus and monopolising new technology.
However in the ensuing two and a half decades, US output declined as a proportion of world manufacturing production to 20 per cent-making the USA still the market leader but no longer predominant. The trade surplus has been converted into a deficit and in the last four years the total value of the deficit on overseas payments has exceeded the combined amount of surpluses in the previous 70 years! And for the first time, in 1984, there was a deficit in the US trade of high technology ($5 billion and rising).
This is the underlying condition of the Us economy which could only be temporarily hidden by the Reaganite itlusion of growth, based on arms expenditure and government borrowing. Now the chickens have come home to roost. And with a downturn in the US economy, the rest of the capitalist world will feel the chill winds of recession again. In the UK it never seems to have warmed up!
Real manual wages fal
manual wages under Thatcher
AGAIN IN the last issue of the MIR, this column presented conclusive evidence not widely published that wage rises have not been a cause of rising unemployment. The government and Tory economists have insisted that unemployment could be lowered if wage rises and even wage levels were reduced. Yet the wage statistics show
28
that since the Tories came to power in 1979, manual workers' real wages have actually declined while unemployment among these workers has risen the most. (See Economic Notes, MIR, Winter 1985).
Now further evidence has been published by Christopher Huhne of The Guardian newspaper. Taking the government's own New Earnings Survey, he finds that the top ten per cent of adult male earners (the best paid managers, etc) increased their real gross hourly earnings by 19 per cent from April 1979 to April 1984. In the same period the bottom 10 per cent of earners (low-paid manual workers) had a cut in real wages of 0.2 per cent and the poorest of them suffered a cut of 1.5 per cent. That means that some of the poorest paid workers in Britain in 1979 are even worse off in absolute terms in 1985. And these workers have suffered the sharpest increases in unemployment. If capitalism and the 'free market' can knock you down, then they put the boot in.
at the profits
A NEW survey by DRI Europe confirms the widely held view that manufacturing profitability has steadily declined in most industrialised capitalist economies over the last 30 years.
DRI estimated that for the period 1955 - 82, the rate of return on capital invested in manufacturing fell in the USA from 22 per cent to 11 per cent. In Japan, it rose to 40 per cent in the mid-sixties and then fell back to 22 per cent by 1982. In West Germany there was a similar rise in the sixties to 26 per cent before the decline set in to 12 per cent by 1982.
But the most startling fall was in the UK. From a 17 per cent level in 1956, the rate of profit dropped to five per cent in 1982. In the last two years total profits in manufacturing have jumped up by over 20 per cent per an. num. But this boost is still way short of restoring rates of return in manufacturing to levels enjoyed by even West German or US capitalists. As a result, when British capitalists have money to invest in manufacturing, they are still likely to send it abroad where returns are greater. Or keep it in the bank where interest rates are higher.
[page 30]
1985:
Letters
WITH THE expansion of the MIR the editors hope to regularly reserve these pages for correspondence from our readers expressing their comments or criticism about the journal or general developments in society or the labour movement. We would also welcome reports on how the MIR has been received in Labour Parties, trade union branches, LPYS branches or women's sections.
Consequently, of course, the views expressed in these pages do not necessarily reflect the ideas of the Editorial Board.
Letters should be sent to the MIR, Letters, 3-13 Hepscott Road, London E9 5HB. The editors reserve the right to shorten letters which are excessively long.
Dear MIR,
I've wanted to write to you for some time. The article on Poland: "A regime on trial" in the January MIR was most interesting, accepting that against terrible odds there is a very high level of activity in the underground making the situation more favourable than in your previous analysis.
Unlike the movement of intellectuals in Czechoslovakia in 1968, easily snuffed out by the Russian invasion, Solidarnosc was and is fundamentally a workers movement which arises inevitably from the day-to-day experiences of Polish workers.
Elsewhere the article describes two apparently contradictory sides of the Polish enigma. On the one hand, the political level of the movement is in some ways lower than in 1956. Yet the movement itself is far broader. The system still had remnants of support in 1956, and was able to play off different sections of the bureaucracy against each other. The oppositionists of the late '40's were rehabilitated and enjoyed temporary popularity. No-one can be rehabilitated today. No government leaders past or present have an unstained record. All have the same bloody hands after martial law, the shot miners, and tortured internees. Indeed, the widespread contempt felt for the state media and their represenatives encourages an apathy which dampens down the political level of the movement. This is the only hope of the government spokesmen like Jerzy Urban, quoted in your article. They hope so force the Poles into grudging accep-
tance of the realities of Stalinism in the
1980's.
Yet on the other hand there is an ac-
ceptance in your article of a very high level of political awareness amongst
the masses in comparison to the West.
I am reminded here of the astonish-
ment shown in Poland at the low figure of party membership in the west. "If
we had real parties here, everyone
would join the party of their choice." Thus we see how a little slice of freedom in the East is eagerly swallow-
ed up, while such freedoms as voting
and joining parties are treated so
apathetically in the West.
Today as in previous years, Solidarnosc marchers have infiltrated and upstaged the May Day parades. The government has solved few of the economic contradictions, and hardly broadened its support since 1981. Your article also correctly pointed to the hostility felt towards the term "socialism" by many and their illusions in "capitalism" because of the liberal reforms it seems to provide. The Stalinist media fails to point out how the labour movement in the west fights for every reform. Yet there are still many people and organisations discussing aspects of "Western socialism" expecially CND, the German Greens and the Mitterrand Government in France. The differences between Stalinism and Eurocommunism, the British Labour Party and the SDP, are also discussed.
There was sadly one embarrassing mistake in your article. You mistook the name of Edmund Baluka for Zbigniew Bujak, a leader in the Ursus Tractor plant. Bujak has been leader of the underground since martial law, and is indeed a hero. Buluka on the other hand led the workers in 1970, came to England and returned to Poland in 1981. He is, I believe, still interned. He is greatly feared because of his experience in the west, and his
Political orient or are Parted the
of the many small left groups in Poland today. (See Voice of Solidarnosc, issue no 102 Feb 1985, pages 8-15 for further information).
A Solidarnose supporter
Dear Comrades,
I was recently in Poland on holiday, and I got the chance to talk to many ordinary Poles about the political situation. On my return I read the article in MIR No 28 which sums up very well the stage through which Polish society is passing.
Despite the fact that it is 3½ years since Jaruselski's coup plunged Poland into a state of emergency, there are no underlying reasons to suggest
29
that the regime has consolidated its
position. In fact after an inevitable
period of demoralisation following the
events of December 1981, all indica-
tions point to the begining of a new up-
turn in the workers movement.
Against the background of falling liv-
ing standards and economic chaos, no
amount of terror, imprisonment and
murder has succeeded in holding back
the opposition to Jaruselski's regime.
The murder by the hated secret
police of pro Solidarity priest Father
Popieluszko has created a national
martyr. Tapes of the priests' sermons,
photo's and souvenirs circulate
amongst millions of Poles. Since the
regime has no authority to impose itself within the grounds of the church,
many churches have displays accom-
panied by Solidarity banners in the
memory of Popieluszko. Amongst the
masses Popieluszko has earned a place
by the side of Walesa as a figurehead opposed to Stalinist tyrany.
Despite the size of Poland's state machine, its network of secret police and informats, most Poles feel free to openly criticise their 'Communist Party' leaders. Often workers feel confident, within reason, to argue with managers at work who are inevitably party members. In tact, despite the difficulties, many Poles feel 'at least its not as bad here as in the Soviet Union'. Numerous workers have no fear of displaying Solidarity calenders and souvenirs within their homes.
Despite having a free hand Jaruselski's military government, has made hardly any inroads into the country's massive economic crisis. 'The crisis' means that today Poles live in wartime-like conditions. Ration cards effecting the purchase of items from meat and butter to petrol dominate everyday life. There is much anger at the fact that despite price increases of often 50 per cent, 100 per cent or more, there is still no sign of the end of rationing. Shortages are as widespread as ever. Daily life revolves around joining a queue and then asking what the queue is for. Shortages effect just about everything, lightbulbs, towels, alarm clocks, toilet rolls, the list is endless. Most children under the age of 10 have never eaten a banana or an orange.
As a means of proping up the bankrupt state economy, the regime in recent years has been lenient towards a thriving private sector. Small private shops and kiosks are springing up everywhere. These often sell Western goods, usually clothing. Although prices are very high, at least Poles can dress a little more fashionably than they did 10 years ago. The future of these small private businesses is always uncertain. Will the regirce a:
[page 31]
SMIR
1985:
Letters
a certain stage clamp down on them? At the time of Solidarity the ranks of the privateers were split. Should they back Solidarity (many did) or would some kind of revolutionary change mean the abolition of the private sector altogether?
The quality of the goods available in the shops, as in other East European countries are often atrocious. These 'Buble' as they are nicknamed include books which have numerous pages missing and kettles with plastic handles which begin to melt once the water reaches boiling point.
Despite daily official propaganda to the contrary, few Poles have any confidence at all in the prospects of an economic recovery. Their attitude is that the West will have to wait forever in order to get its loaned money back. As a result of past bureaucratic mismanagement over 1,000 building and industrial projects have been shelved due to a lack of funds. Partly built shells of factories litter Poland's industrial estates. While these monuments to economic mismanagement are there for everyone to see it is no wonder that many workers feel no incentive to do their bit for the good of economic recovery.
Bearing in mind the problems of everyday life, there is still one grievance which particularly young Poles put above all else. This is the housing problem. There is usually a 15—20 year waiting list for a home. A couple getting married in their mid 20s can expect to get their flat by the time they reach their 40s. Meanwhile it is usually a question of living in one room at the inlaws. These cramped conditions, even if living with inlaws is aceptable to all concerned, often make life unbearable. As a result the number of divorces and single parent families is very high.
The bureaucracy's failure to make any headway with the country's economic prospects has strengthened the thriving underground opposition in Poland. There is no shortage of underground material and publications circulating factories and workers' homes. It is estimated that up to one million Poles are in some way connected with the underground. In some factories subs are still collected by Solidarity activists.
A new generation of activists has been created, mainly youth who are skilled in the methods of underground activity unlike their predecessors who had the luxury of relative liberalism through the Solidarity period.
Such is the extent of the opposition that presently the bureaucracy is passing new laws through parliament to give the police and the courts even more powers to try and combat the
Dear Militant,
Congratulations on the issue (No 28) of the MIR I read to date.
To help put the publication on a firmer financial footing—a suggestion: Why not offer a year's subscription for the magazine? I think it would be worth the extra administration time as it would mean that anyone who buys one issue has the chance to subscribe for a whole year.
Best wishes,
Pauline Maniscalo
Leicester
best have
page
underground. Attending an unofficial demonstration or placing a leaflet or poster in a public place is to become punishable by a prison sentence.
The underground, however, is dominated by the 'intelligentsia' Many who make up this strata of society are former graduates who were promised the earth during the ambitious Gierek days, only to find the unfolding economic crisis resulting in qualified students earning a half or one-third of that of industrial workers. For example, teachers are counted as low-paid workers earning on average only half of what a manual worker in industry would earn.
Some within the intelligentsia could be won to the ideas of genuine Marxism and Trotskyism, however many are an absolute obstacle to progressive change in Poland. A large layer of intellectuals have blind contempt for Polish workers, describing them as "cattle" and "dim" '. They write off with ease a section of the world's most courageous and self-sacrificing workers who time and time again have paid for their courage with their lives. That section of Poland's intelligentsia who pressurised the Solidarity leadership to pursue a moderate line bear a big responsibility for Poland's present predicament.
Without doubt the most prominent legal opposition within Poland today is the church. Ironically the blundering bureaucracy itself is responsible for elevating the standing of the church within society. In recent years the regime's attempts to remove crosses from classrooms and public buildings have provoked mass opposition. The murder of Father Popieluszko has also enormously strengthened the prominence of the church as a focal point of opposition. However what is clear is that the bulk of the church's following is based on political and not just religious sen-
30
timents. For example, before Popieluszko's death workers would travel hundreds of kilometers, often on workplace organised coaches, to Warsaw to listen to the priest's pro- Solidarity sermons. The attendance at any particular church is often influenced by how radical the sermons are likely to be. Many churches sell Solidarity souvenirs at inflated prices and donate profits to Solidarity's cause.
Despite the high level of political consciousness amongst Poles, ideas are very often confused, particularly amongst the intellectuals, dominated sometimes by a pathological hatred of anything Soviet. Even though the country's economy is grossly mismanaged the mass of Polish workers have no wish to return to capitalism. As one worker put it: "And anyway capitalism in Poland is a hypothetical point. What would we do. pick out 10,000 Poles and give them all a factory?'
However a number of confused and contradictory ideas do exist. A section of workers who see economic chaos a arourd them toy with the idea tha: private ownership would create ince:. ¿ives and therefore take the econor: forward. But the paradox is that thes same workers would never tolera:= their factory being taken over by = capitalist. The fact is that such conf ed ideas are all groping for the answe to the question: "How should =5= economy be run?" The dilema for ::= bureaucracy is that they don't own the factories but are for the present tiz: at least, managing them (or more co: rectly mismanaging them).
The Polish workers have so much latent power, management have bee= forced so tightly into a corner, with little room for manoeuvre, that it would only be a relatively small step for the workers to take over the control and management of industry. This is why the regime is so terrified of independent political thought and activity.
Whatever the tempo of Polish events to come, further conflict and class actions are inevitable. The thought that another opportunity to strike back at the regime is not far away, makes daily life bearable for millions of Poles. The tragedy is that every Pole has a different answer to the reason why the Solidarity era was hurriedly brought to an end. Even the most politically aware are not clear on the way forward and have not learned all the lessons of the past. Poland today is yet another glaring example of the importance of the subjective factor, that is to say a clear leadership in the unfolding world revolution.
Yours fraternally,
A recent visitor to Poland
[page 32]
MIR June 1985: