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The Chilean Communist Party and the road to socialism By Carmelo Furci Published by Zed Books 1984 £6.50 Reviewed by Martin Gonzalez The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism VENEREMOS THE CHILEAN Communist Party is unique within Latin America in that it was the first workers party to be set up, and because of the enormous strength that the party has had since it's foundation. In fact the PCCh is the biggest CP on the South American This loyalty towards the traditional organisations is both a testament to the workers sense of unity within their ranks and to the thousands of young workers, many of whom have given their lives to strengthen the struggle for socialism through the CP. However in reading through Carmelo Furci's book it is incredible to see how many opportunities the PCCh for the socialist has had, and lost, transformation of society, given it's strength within the workers move ment. The book actually is an indictment of the leaders of the PCCh for their total inability to take the opportunities presented to them by the enormous working class movements that have developed over the past decades. The job of Marxists is to draw out the lessons from a history such as that of the Chilean workers and to analyse the events and mistakes made by the leaders of the movement. Although Furci provides some very good information with facts and figures, much of the time he seems to give the impression that defeats were inevitable, thereby laying the blame on the workers, rather than on the leaders. What is apparent from the whole of the period from the adoption of the Popular Front strategy by the PCCh in 1935 up until 1973, and in its basic analysis at the present time, is the underlying theory that the Chilean national capitalist class still has a role to play within society and can develop the economy. This is despite the whole history of the Chilean class struggle where the Chilean capitalist class has been shown to be a totally weak and parasitical class, never hesitating to ally itself with US imperialism to attempt to crush the workers movement. The Chilean Communist Party was originally founded by Luis Emilio Recabarren, who understood the need to create a separate working class party standing under it's own banner, independant of the capitalist parties. Recabarren proposed that the POS, as it was called then, join the Communist International after a visit to the Soviet Union in 1920.
Popular Frontism The PCCh soon became affected however by the struggle that was taking place in the Comintern between Stalin and Trotsky. In Chile this was reflected by the attempt of an emerg. to impose an ing bureaucracy undemocratic structure on the party and by the adoption of the Stalinist theory of 'social fascism'. By 1933, the differences between the two wings of the party climaxed, with the setting up of the 'Communist Left', a group which split from the official CP and applied to join Trotsky's Fourth International. Recabarren in fact commited suicide in 1924 over, some say, the attempt at a takeover of the PCCh by this new bureaucratic wing. The split off from the Communist party eventually went on to form the Chilean Socialist Party precisley as a result of the struggle against Stalinist ideas and methods.
Following the lead of the Stalinist Comintern, in 1935 the Chilean Communist Party adopted the idea of the Popular Front. The basic "theoretical" foundation for Popular Frontism was the belief that the national bourgeoisie could develop production and independence from US imperialism. Therefore, the so-called theoreticians of the Comintern adopted the idea that all the CP's should support and make pacts and alliances with parties representing the interests of the national bourgeoisie.
As the 7th Congress of the PCCh the victories of the Popular Front in Spain and France, opened the way in our party towards the idea that the National Bourgeoisie had a place in the National Liberation move- . The programme of the Popular Front was that of defending the interests of the Chilean bosses as supporting basic reforms within the existing system. However, once the Popular Front actually won the elections the so-called progressive sector of the bourgeoisie inevitably turned out to be totally against the interests of the workers, particularly when the country found itself affected with economic problems. By 1946 President Videla broke openly with the CP, arrested the leaders and passed the Ley Maldita' which banned the PCCh.
• Furci argues that the PCCh was strenghtened as a result of the Popular Front experience, mainly because the vote for the PCCh reached an all time high of 17% in the August 1947 elections, and that it was only the intervention of US imperialism that caused the break up of the Popular Front government.
In reality however, the PCCh threw away an opportunity to destroy the illusions of sections of the masses with the main representative of the Chilean bourgeoisie who needed no pressure from US imperialism to attack the workers movement. The PCCh could have fought the election on the basis of a united front with the Socialist Party, calling for the socialist transformation of society.
The conclusion however that the CP leadership drew from this defeat, was that there were sectors of the bourgeoisie that were 'closer to imperialism' and could therefore play no progressive role. Therefore, theoreticians of the party concluded that the workers parties must form an alliance, which would include some representatives of the manufacturing' bourgeoisie. This came to be known as the 'Frente de Liberacion Nacional'. This new strategy of the PCCh formally recognised that the workers parties must form the leadership of this alliance, but it still accepted the progressive role of sectors of the bourgeoisie that could develop society. The policy was argued along the following lines "
the bourgeoisie is an ally of imperialism and the oligarchy is wrong In certain situations the bourgeoisie is inclined towards them, but this situation is transitionary and not permanent, and we could modify it if we polarize the contradictions." This "analysis" has shown itself to
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MIR Spring 1986: Book Reviews
be totally incorrect. And even the PCCh had to face up to the fact that the national bourgeoisie was totally at one with imperialism with regard to the need to exploit and attack the working class.
The PCCh and the SP went on to form the FRAP coalition as an electoral alliance in the 1958 presidential elections. Salvador Allende polled an incredible 28.9 per cent of the vote, only 2.9 per cent behind the Conservatives who won the elections. This showed the possibility of a victory for a workers' party coalition, without the inclusion of bosses parties.
During the sixties, the PCCh adopted the idea of the 'Peaceful Road to Socialism'. . This was based upon the belief that the forces of the state were neutral, simply there to protect the homeland and the constitution. This meant in effect that socialism could be introduced peacefully, through parliament, without using arms as a defensive or offensive measure against the army, police or other forces. This theory was based upon the relatively stable political history of Chile compared to other Latin American countries. However, Chilean history had not been free of army intervention, and the belief that the army would never intervene in politics was to prove fatal in the 1973 coup d'etat where the government and the workers were left defenceless.
Lessons of 1970-73
In the 1964 elections the FRAP polled 38.5% of the vote. Only a coalition of the major bourgeois parties managed to keep the workers parties out of government. The conclusion of the PCCh was " ... the country refused us victory because we were the sole leaders. We have to build a popular movement aimed at a government with a broader social and political basis," ie alliances have to be made with non- working class parties.
By 1970, the Chilean capitalist class was totally demoralized and split in the face of a working class offensive. The Christian Democrats were totally discredited. The PCCh looked around desperately for pacts and alliances with the centre. Because of the general left shift within the masses, the Radical Party had also changed it's stance and found its way into the newly formed Popular Unity coalition as well as some other small bourgeois parties. The author regards the inclusion of the Radicals as a historic victory for the Popular Unity because it split the right and allowed the PU government to come to power.
Certain agreements with parties such as the Radicals or MAPU (a splitoff from the Christian Democrats)
were not necessarily incorrect. But the
key consideration should have been
that the workers' parties within the
Popular Unity maintain and act on the
programme of the socialist transfor-
mation of society.
The Bolsheviks in Russia were at
times prepared to make blocs with the
Mensheviks or Social Revolutionaries
on practical matters and even, on cer-
tain occasions, to organise common electoral lists. But at no time did they form any programatic bloc or subordinate themselves politically or organisationally to the Mensheviks or to the Russian equivalents of the Chilean Radicals. However as was to be seen, the inclusion of the Radicals
was used countless times by both the PCCh and Socialist leaders as an excuse to limit the reforms of the Popular Unity goverment.
In the 1970 Presidential elections, the PU coalition, seen as the workers alternative, won the elections. Furci raises two major issues which were to be crucial to the government, relations with the Christian Democrats and the question of the army.
The author, and the PCCh, saw the main task of the PU to ensure good relations with the Christian Democrats to stop it moving to the right. Furci draws parallels with the "ideal" situation in Italy where the PCI and the Christian Democrats enjoy a healthy co-habitation as 'constructive critics' of each other. Therefore from the first day of the PU Allende, supported by the PCCh, attempted to make alliances with the Christian Democrats in parliament to ensure their support.
The problem however that the PCCh faced was that as the economic situation worsened society began • to polarize with the workers demanding attacks upon capitalist property and with the bosses, including the Christan Democrats, eventually adopting a procoup position keeping in line with their true class interests. The determination of the PCCh to keep the support of the Christian Democrats proved fruitless and the Popular Unity government was eventually drowned in blood without a murmur of protest from the so-called 'progressive bourgeoisie'
Because of the insistence of the PCCh on the 'Peaceful Road to Socialism' no defensive plans for the government were drawn up and no attempt was made to alter the composition of the armed forces. As Furci himself states "Popular Unity was a Constitutional government duly elected to govern, and it was assumed that the armed forces would not only not defy the government, but would also be 'neutral' in any political and social conflict." The only attempt made to win the army to the side of the
46
A Militant
Publication
Lessonsof Chile
Lessons of Chile by Jorge Martinez. 70k including postage from: World Socialist Books, 3 - 13 Hepscott Road, London E9 5HB.
government was to offer the generals
places within the cabinet and through
higher pay awards to officers, who
were on the whole hostile to the
government. No appeal was made to
the rank and file soldiers who were far
more sympathetic to the Popular
Unity.
When the coup took place on 11
September 1973, all the illusions and
blunders of the PCCh were paid for in the blood of 50,000 workers including
many Communist workers and rank and file leaders.
Some of the conclusions that Furci reaches when analysing the Popular Unity period are incredible. The author makes statements such as "the Chilean experiment showed the importance of the PDC (Christian Democrats) as a political force that could form part of a progressive government". • The author also blames the fact that there was no agreement within the Popular Unity about policy, ie that there was not agreement on the PCCh policy of alliances and retreat on reforms.
Today the PCCh, as well as Furci have reached totally wrong conclusions about the period between 1970 and 1973. Although the PCCh has now accepted the use of arms to defend the movement, it has not learnt one lesson about the character of the state and the armed forces being instruments of the ruling class, or of the role of the national bourgeoisie represented by their parties. Incredibly the PCCh is repeating the same basic slogans of alliances with the Christian Democrats. Unfortunately the Chilean workers will have to re-learn through their experiences the role of the Christian Democrats and of reformism. This time however they will have the recent experience of the period of 1970 to 1973 to draw upon, which will eventually bury Stalinism and the traitorous policies of class alliances.