Northern

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Northern

Ireland

ettlement

possible?

Is a settleme

at will be the likely outcome, asks

the likely outcome,

Maguire, of the

Hume-Adams

HE JOINT STATEMENT by

John Hume, SDLP leader,

and Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein president, on 25 September met with an avalanche of press coverage. Other discussions have taken place between the Irish and British governments and the DUP has presented the British government with their proposals Breaking the Logjam.

It has been evident for some time that discussions have been taking place behind the scenes. Flowing from the Hume-Adams talks it is now being rumoured that the Provisional IRA are considering a ceasefire with speculation that an interim settlement could be negotiated involving Dublin, London, Sinn Fein, the SDLP and at least a section of the Unionists.

International developments, especially the peace accord between Israel and the PLO, have strengthened the belief that a settiement could be acheived. One of today's buzz words in the international arena is 'conflict resolution'. The negotiations in South Africa with the ANC, and the agreement between PLO leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli prime 16 • Northern Ireland

minister, Yitzhak Rabin, have been cited as examples of intractable problems in the process of resolution.

The leadership of Sinn Fein and the IRA have been affected by these developments. Gerry

Adams recently wrote in his party's theoretical magazine Starry Plough, that "a De Klerk has yet to emerge from the ranks of Unionism". In other words, someone prepared to sit down and negotiate with the republican movement.

The changed balance of forces internationally, with the collapse of Stalinism, has had an effect on the leaderships of the ANC and the PLO. They can no longer depend on Soviet support or look to it as a model. They no longer pose a threat to capitalism and have been convinced of the need to deal with the capitalist class. It is the enormous revolts of the black working class and the intifada of the Palestinian people that has led South Africa and Israel to draw the leaders of' these organisations into negotiations in order to de-rail these movements.

The leaders of the republican movement have also been affected by the propaganda of the capitalists about a New World Order. Last year's republican policy document issued by Sinn Fein, Towards a Lasting Solution, was a cringing appeal to international capitalism to provide a solution to the Northern Ireland conflict.

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Gerry Adams.

This document, and the recent positions developed by republicans, are a recognition of the bankruptcy of the 'Armalite-ballot box strategy adopted under the leadership of Adams-McGuinness- Morrison. The Provos have been compelled to accept that they cannot force the British out of Northern Ireland, nor can they force one million Protestants into a united Ireland.

This has led to a change in republican thinking over the past few years. At the time of the last IRA ceasefire in 1975, for example, Martin McGuinness announced that there would be no further IRA ceasefires unless the British government gave a firm commitment to withdraw. His more recent statements have suggested that the price of an IRA ceasefire might be an announcement from the British government that it has no long term interest in Ireland. During the furore over the leaked document on joint Dublin-London rule over the North produced by Labour's shadow Northern Ireland spokesperson, Gerry Adams said that joint authority could be accepted as a stepping stone to a united Ireland.

In Sinn Fein's Starry Plough, in January 1992, the party's chairman in the North, Mitchel McLauglin, argued that they

would have to ditch

the self-deluding

republican claim

that in the event

of a British with-

drawal the Protes-

tants would come

to realise that their

best interest lay in

a united Ireland.

He added that the

Protestants should

not be coerced into

a united Ireland.

Another senior

Sinn Fein member

argued late last

year that in the

event of a British

withdrawal the

agreement of

Unionists will be

necessary to put

in place any new constitutional arrangements, and if they couldn't be persuaded of the benefits of a united Ireland, then alternative constitutional arrangements will have to be made.

There have also been other signs that the Provos are prepared to move. From 3-10 September the IRA had an unofficial cessation of its camapign. No IRA attacks took place over this seven day period. The Irish-American fact finding mission headed by Bruce Morrisson had let it be known that they wished to talk to Sinn Fein, but only at a time when no military activity was being carried out by the Provos.

LOWING FROM THESE de-

velopments the question is

posed: is a settlement possible? What price would the IRA put on a casefire? What would be the cost of an agreement to the Unionists?

The Provos would demand Sinn Fein's entry into the talks process. Attached to this would likely be withdrawal or phased withdrawal of British troops to barracks, and the scrapping of Britain's repressive legislation, beginning with the censorship laws. It would also include some agreement on the prisoners and a statement from the British that they have

no long-term interest in Ireland. The Provos could demand a declaration of intent to withdraw within a specific time and the IRA would then call a ceasefire. If the Provos held out for this that would be the end of the talks.

The British government could not but be attracted to the possibility of an IRA ceasefire. But they also would place further demands on the republican movement. There has already been speculation that the British army had drawn up a 60-point plan and had secret talks with the IRA to de-escalate the crim

The British government, ste have presided over eight years of stalemate in Northern Ireland. have been forced to acnept that their last 'solution' - the Anglo Irish Agreement - has been a failure. Then, the Agreement was hyped as an historic breakthrough. The intention was to isolate Sinn Fein, smash the Provos and marginalise the extreme loyalists. Then, the 'centre' ground would be encouraged into a power-sharing devolved government.

What price Id the IRA

put on a ceasefire?

But the Thatcher government was met with united loyalist resistance. This effectively neutered the Agreement from the outset. Because of this the protests partially subsided and Thatcher was able to ride these out. Nevertheless, the Tory gorernment learnt one crucial lesson - that any future agreement cannot be negotiated without the Unionists or at least a section of the Unionists.

If the government meets the price of an IRA ceasefire, it is unlikely that they will win favour with the loyalist paramilitaries and their response could be a backlash. Unionists have reacted

Northern Ireland • 17

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to the Hume-Adams statement, claiming that it is further evidence of the existance of a pannationalist front. Peter Robinson, the DUP's deputy leader and the Ulster Unionist MP, John Taylor, both said that the talks could lead to civil war. Ian Paisley, the DUP leader, said that his party would not be prepared to enter any further talks if the British government even considered the Hume-Adams report. Unionist politicians and loyalist paramilitaries have added that the only IRA casefire they would accept would be one where the IRA hands over all its weaponry.

The UDA's Inner Council said that if any deal was done between Dublin and London over the heads of the Unionists they would put their military camapign into top gear and Catholics would 'never have seen the like of it before Previous IRA casefires have led to an intensification of violence. During the 1972 IRA ceasefire loyalist paramilitaries began a binge of sectarian killings against Catholics. From 1969 until the June 1972 ceasefire loyalists killed 35 people. It took them only six weeks from the start of the ceasefire to kill another 35 people. During the ceasefire the Provisionals were active in carrying out sectarian killings of Protestants.

Already loyalist paramilitaries have stepped up recruitment. They are making a simple appeal to a layer of improvished youth in the most deprived Protestant areas: join and stop the sell-out to the IRA and a united Ireland.

HE IRISH GOVERNMENT

and the British government

have already discussed the possibility of the South scrapping articles two and three of the Irish constitution and replacing them with an 'aspiration' for eventual unification. In turn the British government would acknowledge that it has no longterm interest in the North, and that if a majority favoured a united Ireland then Britain would pass the necessary legislation.

The British government may accept that an upsurge in loyalist 18 • Northern Ireland

THE YEAR OF

DECISION

Sol SA

Unionist leaders Paisley and Molyneauz.

killings could be the cost, in the short term, of an agreement which leads to a ceasefire. They could decide to take steps to crack down on the loyalist paramilitaries. They would hope to take the Unionist parties with them, but if they refused they could move to split them. In the Protestant areas they would hope to lean on a majority of the Protestant community as a whole. In the aftermath of a crackdown, the British government would hope an agreement could be cemented.

Already loyalist

paramilitaries

ve stepped

itme

? steppea up recruitment.

However, such a senario, is, to say the least, fraught with enormous difficulties. The British government could seriously migcalculate. They may not be able to entirely contain a backlash, which could spread beyond the

paramilitaries. In such a situation a backlash would invite a reponse from the Provos, a section of the Provos or another republican paramilitary grouping. During previous IRA œasefires the IRA stepped up sectarian assassinations. The result of any future agreement could inflame the situation further.

Even in the event of an agreement, it is ruled out that it would provide a long term solution to the present conflict. The underlying roots of the conflict would remain. Catholic workers will never accept a poverty-ridden Northern Ireland state and Protestants will never accept unity with a backward, poverty-ridden, and as they see it, priest-ridden Southern state.

The only solution lies with the working class - Catholic and Protestant - united and fighting for a socialist solution. Militant Labour advocates a socialist Ireland and a socialist federation of Britain and Ireland on an equal and voluntary basis. Within this, the rights of all minorities would be guaranteed. On this basis there could be a democratic settlement of the conflict.

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