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From Bosnia to Greece, Tony Saunois looks at the developing War clouds over the Balkans •HE APRIL BOMB- INGS carried out by NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovi the subsequent and a, vents which were an huthe liliation for nperialist powers, marked stage in the crisis in new ne Balkans. There is a decloud eloping ationalism throughout the which has now egion pread to Greece, in disute with both Albania and he former Yugoslav repubic of Macedonia. The whole the Balkans if seems loised once again to be ¡lunged into a whirlpool of lational and ethnic conlict.
The consequences of hese events will be felt hroughout Europe. The processes at work in this trea, when put alongside he tremendous mass movements which have ocked France, Germany, Italy and other counries of Europe, graphically illustrate the contradictory nature of the new epoch. ent wave of nationalist/ethnic reaction in the Balkans, however brutal and vicious it appears to be, will not last indefinitely. After suffering a decade of carnage in the Lebanon the proletariat re-emerged with a general strike in 1993. In Serbia there is already a widespread opposition 24 • Balkans of MUNCH The Scream 1893 Yet it is important to emphasise that the cur- BOSNIA isation, Nezavisnost (Independence). crisis in the Balkans.
Alan Harderan The Scream 1994 developing to the regime. Although contradictory, the beginnings of a movement of the proletariat can be seen, reflected in such developments as the formation of the 100,000 strong trade union organ- •HE COLLAPSE OF the Vance/Owen plan, and now the crumbling of the peace agreement which emerged from the siege of Sarajevo, illustrate the impossiblity of imperialism imposing a stable solution on this
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iflict. Since April 1992 three ace initiatives have been atnpted and each has broken wn. At the same time, a tembe balance rary can ablished for a period. Indeed, s appeared to be the case as : Bosnian Serb bombardment Sarajevo was ended. Within s, however, there still existed points of conflict tential lund which a further conflaition could explode.
Gorazde was one such point conflict. The Bosnian Serbs dertook the offensive around : city and put it under siege, ause of its strategic impor- They sought control of Ice.
: Drina river and the impor- Albanian protest in Kosovo.
It road north. In doing so y expanded their territory, ing more from the Bosnian Muslims. This situon did not suddenly arise but had been reloping over a period. There are other potential nts of conflict, such as Tuzla. These could erupt • open conflict even if a new agreement is ched, provoking a general conflict between Serand the fragile Muslim/Croat alliance which 3 been formed with the encouragement of West- 1 imperialism.
The current wave of nationalist/ethnic reaction will not last indefinitely.
Serbia and Croatia originally arrived at an 'eement for the partition of Bosnia as part of ir parallel objectives of establishing a greater bia and a greater Croatia. Croatia established nini-state' in western Bosnia. In the east, Serbia nched a military offensive in Srebrenica in deace of the Vance/Owen peace plan as part of its ective of establishing a de facto 'Greater Serbia'. e attack on Gorazde was part of this general ective.
Imperialism's interests are best served by conthe Bosnian conflict. Thus the Western vers have attempted to establish a three-way ision of Bosnia, and acquiesced to the Serbs ing Srebrenica. We commented at the time that s "could be quickly followed by the Serbian ces taking the southern Muslim enclaves of razde and Zepa". (MIR No.51, May/June 1993). Since then Croatia has switched sides and med an alliance with the Bosnian Muslims, folring intense pressure from Western imperialism. e Croat forces now believe they will secure a better deal from this alliance and are also looking for a counter-weight to Russia's imperialist aspirations in the area.
If the conflict escalates, with further clashes between Muslim/Croat forces and the Serbs, it will inflame still further the nationalist fires which are already burning in other parts of the Balkans. This is especially true in relation to the conflict between Albania and Greece, which is linked inseparably to the explosive cocktail which exists in Kosovo. The Serbian attack on Gorazde provoked NATO to launch limited air strikes. Imperialism wishes to try and check Serbian expansionism and teach them a lesson. They hope also to warn other countries in the region against adopting an expansionist policy, which would further destabilise the area. At the same time, they are also reflecting the pressure of public opinion which has been demanding action to stop the slaughter. Through being seen to take effective action, the imperialist powers hope to be able to defend their own prestige and avoid appearing impotent in the face of a crisis on the European mainland Another factor in the calculations of US imperialism was the need to regain the initiative following the deployment of 800 Russian troops to Sarajevo after the peace agreement. The Russian initiative, reflecting the emergence of a more aggressive Russian imperialism (though still a lesser power than the US), clearly wrongfooted the Western powers.
The intervention by the Yeltsin regime into the war in Bosnia marks an important development, confirming the previous analysis made by the MIR of post-Stalinist Russia. Although an economically weaker power than US or German imperialism, Russia is still a powerful military force, with its own imperialist ambitions within its sphere of influence. It has already asserted this role in some of the republics of the former USSR. Russia's in- Balkans • 25
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tervention in this crisis shows how its interests will come into collision with those of other, more powerful, imperialist powers.
The Russian initiative clearly wrongfooted the Western powers.
Yeltsin, increasingly isolated in Moscow, is compelled to look over his shoulder at the extreme nationalist forces in Russia. The depth of the crisis in Russia is preparing the way for Yeltsin's downfall - probably sooner rather than later. It is likely that he will be replaced by a more strident Russian nationalist regime, possibly led by Rutskoi. This development would prepare the way for an even aggressive Russian foreign policy. The extremely powerful traditions of Pan-Slavism, which links Russia and Serbia, together with the traditional Orthodox Christian alliance which also includes Greece, are important ingredients in the processes unfolding in the Balkans. This may even result in the eventual military involvement of Russian forces (possibly under the cover of mercenaries), should the conflict involving Serbian forces accelerate. After initially welcoming the deployment of a small Russian peace-keeping force, US imperialism is now recognising the potential danger for the future symbolised by this initiative.
HE PROBLEM THAT the imperialist powers now confront is how to proceed. Air strikes alone will not achieve their objectives. They have only served to polarise the situation further and pushed the Bosnian Serbs to adopt a far more aggressive policy towards the UN/NATO forces. At the same time, the Muslim forces have demanded further action. Moreover, the bombings increased the tensions between NATO and Russia and have strengthened the ultra-nation- NATO alist forces in Russia. In every respect, sit not enthat impera ler ind tactics have have only served to worsen the crisis, Morie of the mass to ta facing imperialism, however, The dilemma that to do nothing, allowing the Serb forces to continue their assault unchecked, will further expose the impotence of NATO and the UN, and undermine the apparent propaganda victory gained through lifting the seige on Sarajevo. Despite the escalation which has taken place around Gorazde, it is still possible that the Serbian regime will try and the crisis will be to secure agreement all defused - for a time.
The Milosevic regime is confronted with a massive crisis at home due to the war. War weariness 26 • Balkans is gripping the population. The Serbian state's military forces are conducting the war without the enthusiasm of the population.
The economy has been pushed to the point of collapse by the war and the breakdown in trade. Industrial production fell by 40% during 1993 and gross domestic product (GDP) now stands at only a third of its 1990 level. As a result, agriculture now accounts for more than 50% of GDP. 750,000 workers - 25% of the workforce - are registered as unemployed and a further 1.2 million are on paid leave. In February, pensioners were told that they would only be paid just over 50% of their state benefit. The regime is faced with the prospect of mass opposition and social unrest.
It would be a mistake to conclude that the Bosnian Serbs are forces beyond Milosevic's control. The Serbian regime is controlling the tap supplying them with arms and supplies. As capitalist commentators have pointed out, when the Sarajevo peace agreement was concluded, the guns stopped firing without delay.
If it were only a question of logic the Serbian regime would move to defuse the situation and, if possible, reach an agreement. Serbia, having won control of 70% of Bosnia, has in many respects achieved its war objectives but now confronts an economic catastrophe. Imperialism is desperate to contain the crisis and maintain some prestige. There are ingredients, however, which prevent a simple logical' solution.
Imperialism has attempted to develop a strategy of forging a new alliance between Croatian and Muslim forces. This has been successful up to the present. The Western powers hope to use this federation to counter-balance the areas now under Serbian rule. They are also exploring the possibility of using Croatian/Bosnian Muslim forces as a bulwark against the Bosnian Serbs. If the situation escalates, it is possible that imperialism will arm Croatian and Muslim forces and conduct a struggle against the Serbs by proxy. This could lead to further, extremely bloody conflict. According to recent reports (18 April), around Gornji Vakuf (where formerly Muslim BiH forces were in conflict with the Croat HVO), the BiH has withdrawn and moved north towards Zepce and begun assaults on the Bosnian Serbs. HVO artillery has been moved into position to support the BiH offensive. The Croat/Muslim agreement has been greeted with enthusiasm at this stage. But, at a later stage the alliance could break down, in some areas, or the Croatian forces could split. A major conflict between the Bosnian Serb forces Croatian/Muslim forces, backed by the Western imperialist powers, would be an extremely bloody struggle. Both sides would rather avoid such a conflict, but the situation could nevertheless spiral out of control. The growing possiblity of such a development vindicates our position of opposing the demand to 'arm the Muslims'. While supporting the right of all minorities to arm and defend them-
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REDE i-UN demonstration in Sarajevo.
ves from attack, we could not support a demand lich would, in reality, mean the arming by impeilism of Muslim leaders with the aim of 'thering the interests of the Western powers. Imperialism, if it does arm these forces, will sure that the arms are under the control of a uslim elite. Those grouplets which have simply ised the call 'arm the Muslims' now face the aspect of being left as attorneys for an alliance cked by the Western imperialist powers.
THE EVENTS IN Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia are part of a series of develop-
ing national conflicts throughout the
Balkans. Recently the upsurge of national isions has emerged especially sharply in Greece, lere a nationalist wave has been whipped up. It s centred on the issue of Macedonia, but increasşly the conflict with Albania has come to the
Coupled with other developments, Greek nationsm could possibly slow the rhythm of struggle of e Greek proletariat. The relatively dormant but ep-rooted nationalism of Greek society is in the ocess of being unleashed. It has been spearaded by the leadership of PASOK and the irkers' organisations, and reinforced by the bouroisie. They are now competing with each other
to who can shout their Greek nationalism the ıdest.
One of the biggest demonstrations ever held in 'eece, over one million strong, took place in Sanika in April. A surge of propaganda has been ganised, ranging from the appearance of the head
Alexander the Great on coins to videos being own on all the flights of the national airline. lice now wear Star of Vergina emblems, the mbol associated with Alexander the Great. The thodox church has begun to unleash an orgy of
reactionary propaganda of Christiar
Orthodoxy with Slavism, thereby link-
ing Greece to Serbia and Russia, in
opposition to the non-Christian Mus-
lims. This has been fuelled by the
election successes of Islamic fundamen-
talists in neighbouring Turkey, Greece's
traditional opponent, which recently
stopped all building on the Greek Or-
thodox cathedral in Istanbul.
The extreme nationalist sentiments
propagated by the church are the ideo
logical clothes of a reactionary minority
in Greek society. By appealing to such
sentiments, the leadership of PASOK
has attempted to divert the attention of
the proletariat from the pro-bourgeois
austerity policies of the government.
Similarly, the PASOK leaders have
taken measures against the Greek mon-
archy, which, although we support
them, are a secondary issue.
There is a powerful anti-imperialist sentiment amongst the masses in Greece. However, the current nationalist wave is of a reactionary character. This campaign has been unleashed against the background of a severe economic recession in which 30% of all businesses are on the brink of bankruptcy and, according to some estimates, up to 40% of the economy goes through the black market.
These factors come together after nearly two decades of intense struggle by the Greek proletariat. Because of the policies of the PASOK leadership the issue of nationalism is set to dominate the situation for a period. This may delay a powerful movement against the measures of the PASOK government. Papandreou has taken this direction with the reluctant support from the most far-sighted sections of the Greek ruling class. They fear that he may trigger a situation which they will not be able to control.
Macedonia, with a population of two million, has provided the initial catalyst for the nationalist fervour. Papandreou imposed an embargo on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' (FYROM) in response to US recognition of FYROM. Greece has opposed the republic adopting the name Macedonia, objected to it using the Star of Vergina on its flag, and denounced its constitution on the grounds that it implies a territorial claim over northern Greece. Behind this are the historical fears of the Greek bourgeoisie of territorial claims being made against it. Greece regards its own northern territory as Macedonia', within which is a Muslim minority.
The rapid escalation of the dispute is a measure of the instability of the region. The Greek ruling class and PASOK only a few months ago were moving to accept a compromise. Macedonia itself accepted that it would change its flag, amend its constitution and call itself New Macedonia. Without
Balkans 27
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onsulting Athens, however, the US announced its ecognition of FYROM. Papandreou immediately relied with the imposition of an embargo. The Lacedonian government responded by exploring ther trade routes through Albania and Bulgaria. The rapid escalation of the dispute is a measure of the instability of the region.
This dispute has brought the European bourgeoiie into open conflict with their Greek counterparts. he imperialist powers fear the effect that the lestabilisation of Macedonia will have in the Balans cauldron. Before Greece imposed its embargo, FDP in Macedonia had fallen by 30% since 1991. 1 severe drought cut agricultural output last year ly over 20%. There is a fear that the developing conomic crisis will increase demands from the This could Auslim minority within Macedonia.
rush the Slav layers of the population into the Orthodox Christian camp, involving Serbia and Freece. (Macedonia's population designate themelves to be 65% Macedonian, 21% Albanian, 10% jerbs, 5% Turk and about 100,000 as Vlahoi, a treek minority).
ONTAINED WITHIN THE dispute with C -Macedonia, with its Albanian Muslim minority, are the seeds of a potentially more explosive conflict with Albania itself.
inked to this is the powder-keg which exists in he republic of Kosovo (as it is known to the Albanians) or Kosmet (to the Serbs) - known hroughout the region as the 'Balkan Tinderbox' After a period of autonomy it was forcibly re-integrated into Serbia in 1989. With 90% of its population Albanian, it is ruled by a ruthless Serb ninority which rests upon the might of the Serbian egime.
Kosovo has a crucial place in the history of both Serbs and Albanians. It is regarded by the Serbs is their 'Jerusalem' and the 'hub' of their culture and history. It is not an accident that Milosevic aunched his bid for the leadership from Kosovo. For Serbia it is also a source of mineral wealth. For the Albanians it has a similar historical imvortance.
If Kosovo erupts, it would ignite the bloodiest conflict in the Balkans. The Albanian government publicly recognises that it does not have the strength to intervene in Kosovo and directly confront Serbia. However, if an uprising of Albanians in Kosovo takes place, it would inevitably raise the prospect of a movement of Albanians to form armed militias and cross into Kosovo. Even before the 28 • Balkans recent crisis, the attempts by the Albanian regime to reassemble its conscript army, found up to 100,000 troops concentrated on its northern and eastern borders with Kosovo.
Up to now, the leadership of the Albanians in Kosovo have prevented an explosion taking place, adopting a 'Gandhian' resistance to Serb rule. They have been able to maintain this because of the fear of the consequences of a rising. At the same time, 'a wait and see how Serbia fares in Bosnia' mood has existed. The key question is, how much longer can this policy last?
Thousands have been tortured and hundreds killed under Serbian rule. An alternative Albanian society has developed, which even includes underground schools and hospitals. A boiling cauldron of Albanian rage is bubbling away.
Recently, a more aggressive and determined leadership amongst the Albanian minority in Macedonia has emerged. It has been encouraged by the regime in Albania, where the aspiration for a 'Greater Albania' is still to be found. This development is reportedly serving to strengthen a more militant wing amongst Albanians in Kosovo. Moreover, as events in Bosnia have demonstrated, Turkey would lend support to Muslim minorities, especially those involved in conflict with Greece. FURTHER INGREDIENT in the tinder A box is the Greek minority in southern Albania, Northern Epirus, who are calling for the area to be incorporated into Greece. According to the Albanian regime, there are 60,000 Greeks involved, 300,000 according to population of 3.3 Greece, out of Albania's million.
Up until now, the clashes have been minor, reflected in a raid, allegedly by Greek commandos, on an Albanian border post. The raid itself, in which two Albanian soldiers were killed, was claimed to be the work of the recently formed Northern Epirus Liberation Front. It was possibly undertaken with the tacit support of a section of the Greek military. This provoked the mutual expulsion of diplomats from both Greece and Albania. Fear of the escalation of this conflict has resulted in Albania stepping back and apologising to Greece. However, the rapid sharpening of tensions, in part fed by the conflict in Bosnia, illustrates the dangers which exist for the development of a broader conflict in the Balkans. This is viewed with horror by the imperialist powers, who will apply massive pressure to try and prevent it. The EU is threatening action against Greece over its embargo on Macedonia. The EU is also threatening to withdraw subsidies from Greece. Fearful of the acceleration of the conflict and its likely repercussions, the European bourgeoisie is trying to bring the Greek ruling class into line. Neither the ruling class in Greece nor Albania want a major conflict to develop. Greece is formally stressing that it has no claims upon Northern
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Epirus.
However, the situation is not fully under their control. One fear is that Serbian forces may now begin to supply arms to militias in Northern Epirus. The danger lies in the unleashing of forces which neither imperialism nor the indigenous ruling classes can control. This unquantifiable factor must not be underestimated, especially in such an explosive arena as the Balkans. A further potential point of conflict which could develop lies in the Serbian minority in Hungary which would also be drawn in should a generalised conflict erupt.
A major conflict is posed as a serious possibility over a period of time. More likely in the short to medium term, however, is an escalation in tensions and the outbreak of border clashes. These in themselves can assume a serious character. To this will also be linked a general rise in nationalist poison and persecution.
In Greece this could see a rise in discrimination and attacks against the estimated 200,000 Albanians. Most are illegal immigrants who have flooded over the border after the collapse of the Stalinist regime. They now constitute one of the most downtrodden sections of poverty-ridden Greek society.
A measure of the vicious form this can take was demonstrated during 1993, under the government of New Democracy. Following the expulsion from Albania of a Greek priest who had distributed maps showing Northern Epirus incorporated into Greece, 30,000 Albanians were rounded up by the police and deported.
HILE RECOGNISING THE complex
situation which is developing in the
Balkans, we must also emphasise that
this wave of nationalism will not be the dominant feature indefinitely. At this stage it represents a setback for the proletariat in the area, but it will be a temporary phase. The developing opposition to the regime in Serbia will be of decisive importance in shaping events throughout the Balkans. It will be an important factor in checking how far the nationalist conflicts can develop. Strikes involving miners, rail and transport workers broke out at the beginning of 1994. A strike in February involving 12,000 metal workers was only averted when the government conceded their demands.
The nationalist wave in Greece will subside at a certain stage. It will particularly be affected by the struggles of the proletariat in Europe. Whilst a more generalised movement of the Greek proletariat may be delayed under the PASOK government, big upheavals, such as the current struggle of the tobacco workers in northern Greece, can still break out.
The power of the Greek proletariat has not been broken. Whilst it may pause for breath after the last two decades of struggle, a renewed offensive is inevitable. As it unfolds, the diminishing illusions which exist the PASOK leadership can
result in the movement assuming an even more explosive character. The eventual opposition of the Greek proletariat and youth to those leaders who have tried to deliver them into the jaws of nationalism should not be underestimated.
Xekinhima, Militant Labour's sister organisation in Greece, by energetically combating the existing nationalist fervour, can place itself in an important position to reap big gains when the mood changes. Xekinhima have already stood out on the issue of Macedonia, defending the right of Yugoslav Macedonia to adopt the name decided by its people and opposing the embargo imposed by the Greek government. A further issue of increasing importance is the defence of the rights of the Albanian .minority in Greece.
Xekinhima have also demanded that the workers' organisations in Greece take concrete steps to establish links with the workers' movement in the Balkans to cut across nationalism and chauvinism. This we have linked to the struggle to establish a Socialist Federation of the Balkans as the only means of resolving the national conflicts and defending the democratic rights of all minorities.
Even now, important layers of Greek youth are in opposition to the current nationalist wave. They look with horror at the slaughter which has developed in Bosnia. By resisting the pressures of nationalism and ethnic conflict we can act as a clear pole of attraction and steel important forces, around which big layers of the proletariat throughout the Balkans can be won.
Macedonians celebrate independence, 1991.
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