Militant International Review Archive

The theoretical journal of the Militant tendency, 1969–1995

Historic struggle – hard lessons

No. 739, 8 March 1985 · pp. 8-10 of the scan · 4,203 words

The scan: Militant 739 1985-03-08.pdf (PDF, opens at this page)

This text was corrected by hand against the scan: transcribed from the scans of pp. 8-10 (the "Miners special"), 19 November 2026. Unsigned. The headline runs across the spread of pp. 8-9; the article runs from p. 8 to p. 9 and is "Continued from page nine" over the whole of p. 10. The boxed "A programme for the NUM" on p. 9 is a separate panel and is given as its own article; the pull-quote on p. 8 (a repeat of a sentence in the text) is left out; the two photo captions are given at the end. The words before "81% of NACODS members" are missing in print (the line is blank there). Printed misspellings kept: "extention", "occured", "neccessary", "intitiated"; italics are not shown.

THE MINERS have long been looked upon as the Brigade of Guards of the British Working Class. Thatcher's intention was to break the back of the NUM, take the struggle in the pits off the agenda for a generation and in doing so shatter the fighting spirits of the wider labour and trade union movement.

The inability of the union leaders to mount an effective campaign in support of ASLEF, the NGA and the GCHQ civil servants, gave the Tories the confidence to attack. As Thatcher is fond of repeating: weakness invites aggression.

This battle was planned carefully, over years by the Tories. The Ridley Report, written while the Tories were in opposition, laid down the blue-print for battle with the miners.

Coalstocks were built up. Contingencies were made for the mass importation of coal. Potential scab haulage firms were lined up. An estimated £10bn was spent on switching power stations to dual coal and oil firing and on developing nuclear power. Social security payments to strikers were attacked and the police were deployed as a national strike-breaking force. The Tories prepared for war. Thatcher had defeated General Galtieri. This time she hoped to inflict a rapid, humiliating defeat upon the miners.

The Tories had learnt from the bruising experiences of '72 and '74. The attitude of miners and their families and of workers throughout the whole of the labour movement will now be: 'We will study carefully all the lessons of this strike'. This will be the very best possible preparation for all future battles that will be forced upon us by the Tories and the parasitic class that they represent.

There is one vivid, central lesson from this dispute which activists within the labour and trade union movement will ignore at their peril, that is the need to thoroughly rearm the working class with a fighting, socialist leadership.

The crisis of the leadership within the labour movement has never been placed in sharper focus. As the general staff of an army of millions of organised workers, the leaders of the trade unions possess unrivalled potential authority. However, once again, they either refused or were simply incapable of using that authority to assist the miners.

The lame excuse from right and left was "we cannot deliver" but the support of the rank and file could not be questioned. All that was lacking was the lead.

Millions of pounds were collected for the miners. Support groups mushroomed everywhere. Even in the last days of the strike, a poll revealed that over 40 per cent of trade unionists supported the miners—despite the lack of leadership and the poison of the press.

In the first months of the strike the Tories moved gingerly, fearing that one wrong move, one provocation could provoke all-out struggle by the trade unions in support of the miners.

At any stage in the dispute even a hesitant call from the trade union leaders would have evoked an earth-shattering response. But the right-wing leaders stood aloof, they preferred to act as neutral arbiters rather than as the class leaders that this decisive struggle and their positions within the labour movement demanded.

As every device to defeat the struggle failed, so the Tories increasingly turned for support to the trade union and labour leadership.

The right-wing journal The Economist commented in the run up to the September TUC that: "The TUC may be an ironic weapon for Mrs Thatcher to wave in the face of the union militants, but at present it is the best she has".

But the mass pressure of the rank and file turned this situation totally around. It was Hammond, Sirs and the right-wing strike-breakers who were isolated. Other right and centre unions came to the rostrum to pledge support to the miners. Gavin Laird, of the AUEW, said that there was a "new situation" now that the miners had "finally come to the TUC". Had the miners come to the TUC earlier, undoubtedly they would have faced the same fate as the civil servants of GCHQ or the train drivers of ASLEF.

Ned Smith, the now ex-director of labour relations at the NCB commented that the failure of the Trades Union Congress to deliver "total support" for the miners was the turning point in the attitude of the government.

What of the left-wing leaders of the trade unions? Without the pressure of the rank and file, the right-wing leaders of the TUC would have attempted to organise a surrender to the Tories months ago. The left genuinely wished to help the cause of the miners.

They simply lacked the most elementary strategy, tactics and methods to do so, and the necessary confidence and faith in their own rank and file. This strike demonstrates sharply the importance of theory and of an understanding of perspectives for those who have leading positions in the labour movement. The infection of "new realism" had even spread through most of the left leaders. Despite the example of the miners and their families and all the magnificent support, they still simply did not believe their own members would respond if called upon to fight.

The leaders of the left-wing trade unions, as a minimum, should have stood together and organised alongside the miners for a one-day general strike.

The rank and file, even of the right-wing unions would have joined in enthusiastically, and the whole future course of this strike would have completely changed. They should have fought this policy through the TUC. The miners had already battled for months. Nevertheless the left and the TUC as a whole merely gave a general call for the blacking of coal and coal substitutes. Then little in practice was done to implement this call. Bureaucratically, even in the left unions, the campaign amounted to a series of circulars, which were often sat upon or ignored by unsympathetic local officials.

There were honourable exceptions. Seamen blacked coal throughout. Railway workers in the NUR and ASLEF stood firm despite victimisations of their own members. Even in these two industries, however, little was done by the leaders to link up in action with the miners.

Seamen face a range of acute problems. In the course of this strike, the privatisation of Sealink went through. A campaign by the leadership for all-out strike action alongside the miners could have saved not only Sealink but would have massively enhanced the struggle of the miners.

Rail workers face the closure of workshops, attacks on their pay and cuts in services. Sixty per cent of all freight carried on the trains is coal, everywhere on the railways there is a deep understanding that the interests of miners and railworkers are indissolubly interconnected.

Thatcher personally intervened in negotiations over railway pay to ensure that the offer from the railways board was sufficient to attract the railway union leaders and avoid a strike of railway workers together with miners.

With a clear lead from the top, railway workers would have moved as a body alongside their brothers in the mining industry. The rail unions and the NUM were the two left wing arms of the Triple Alliance. A united movement of rail and coal workers would have altered completely the attitudes in the steel industry, leading at least to a strengthening of solidarity action and possibly united action across three industries.

The Transport and General Workers Union, the largest left union of all, has the capacity in a whole number of industries to cripple the economic life of British capitalism.

Shamefully, the powerful machine of the Transport and General Workers Union was never decisively turned towards the miners' strike.

Dockers refused to handle coal. As a result two disputes flared up. The Tories stumbled into the first. The second was cynically and carefully provoked.

When the dockers came out, the worst fear of the capitalist class had been realised; another strong group of workers was fighting side by side with the miners. Frenzied talk of a 'State of Emergency' flared. The Tories were reeling.

But instead of openly and boldly fighting to link the dockers and the miners' strike together, the leaders of the TGWU presented the dockers' dispute as an entirely separate affair. They denied that the strikes were political when clearly, as with the miners strike, they were cynically provoked by the Tory government.

This was played upon by the media. Many dockers were led to believe they were somehow being dragooned into all-out strike action without an honest explanation of what was at stake.

Docks and BL

The demand should have come forward for an extention of the Dock Labour Scheme to all docks. Joint strike committees of dockers and miners should have been formed to campaign for wider solidarity.

Other moments occured where, with a clear lead from the top, the mass of the Transport and General Workers Union could have been together in action.

One moment stands out from all the rest. In November, following the strike at BL, the TGWU was fined £200,000 under the Tories' anti-trade union legislation. The TGWU executive's reaction was opposition, with but folded-arms.

A special delegate conference should have been convened and the call should have gone out for a systematic campaign to organise all-out strike action throughout the T&G in defence of the union and with the miners.

The leadership refused to pay the money, refused to go to court, then they simply sat back passively while the sequestrator plundered TGWU funds.

The lesson is: left-wing leaders are generally closer and far more subject to the pressure of the rank and file. But in fighting to elect left-wing leaders in all the unions, activists should ensure that these leaders are selected on their proven record and on a clear socialist programme which meets the needs of the rank and file. The left must demonstrate a clear willingness to campaign and mobilise the ranks of the union to fight on such decisive issues.

We must ensure that all trade union officials are subject to thorough democratic checks and that in all unions democratic Broad Left campaigning groups are built involving the widest cross section possible. Broad Lefts must organise and channel pressure from below. The Broad Left Organising Committee (BLOC) which already covers over twenty unions also now assumes enormous importance.

Despite the failure of the leaders of the labour movement to organise mass solidarity action the sheer will to win, the determination, the courage, initiative and loyalty to the union of the mass of miners nationally, carried this strike forward.

The miners were also armed with leaders, especially in the person of Arthur Scargill, the union's president, which proved—despite the most filthy personal abuse and character assassination, to be unbreakable. No doubt these leaders were buoyed up and inspired by the fierce loyalty of the rank and file. But the rank and file were also inspired, day after day, by the unbending leader they saw at the centre of their fight.

This strike shows also, however, that by itself, an unbending will is insufficient. Clear strategy and tactics and timing are also decisive and these were not always shown even by the best NUM leaders.

The campaign to turn the authority of the NUM within the wider working class into concrete solidarity action was, in the main conducted by discussions and debates with other union leaders, rather than by than [sic] clear and precise calls for action, backed up by carefully organised campaigns for support involving the whole of the NUM.

Week after week, Militant argued the need for a one-day general strike. The TUC refused to live up to their historic responsibilities. The left trade union leaders were consoling each other that their members wouldn't struggle.

24-hour general strike

The NUM should have named the day for a 24-hour general strike, if necessary over the heads of the TUC leaders. They should have demanded open support from all other left unions. Conferences and rallies should have been organised in every area of shop stewards and union activists.

Miners should have gone into factories and workplaces to speak to mass meetings. Factory gate meetings should have been organised. Such a campaign would have brought about the biggest united day of action seen in Britain for generations.

In the run-up to the TUC, Militant argued for the NUM to name a date two or three weeks after the TUC. Such a call for general strike action would have set in train an unstoppable process. Activists throughout industry would have begun immediately to organise support.

Pressure from below would have forced the left trade union leaders to line up with the NUM. The TUC itself would have been forced to add its authority to this action.

Instead, the NUM complied with the idea of more general calls for support. A resolution from the furniture trades union call for a day of solidarity action was withdrawn from the agenda.

Militant continued week after week to argue the case for the NUM to boldly seize the initiative by naming the date for a one day general strike.

After the Christmas period, in the last weeks of the strike we believe that the tide of events could have turned dramatically if this call had been made, along with the neccessary campaign for support.

NACODS and Notts

When the lessons of this strike are analysed, the attention of NUM members will centre also on the Nottinghamshire NUM and NACODS. It is to the eternal shame of the leaders of these organisations that in the gravest moment in the history of their industry they stood aside from the fight.

The rank and file should not be blamed. With different leadership they would have joined this battle. [words missing in print] 81% of NACODS members for strike action. The NACODS leaders, with the Tories in dread of a total mining stoppage—negotiated their own separate deal.

The government conceded an independent review body as a further stage in the colliery review procedure. The NACODS leaders then left the scene of struggle. Ironically, the subsequent refusal of the NCB to grant this deal to the NUM completely discredits the whole basis of the agreement won by NACODS, whose members must work alongside NUM members.

In the wake of this strike miners must step up the battle for one union within the industry. Joint discussion committees should be intitiated from below to fight for one union on democratic lines.

In preparation for the battles of the future, miners nationally will also have to turn their attention to the issue that is now of critical importance: the campaign to win the ordinary Nottingham miners away from their treacherous scab leaders begin. In our opinion this fight is best conducted within the framework of one united organisation.

There is every reason for confidence that this fight will be won. Yorkshire was at one time a right-wing area of the union. By a systematic campaign and drawing on the experience of struggle the left in Yorkshire won a majority.

There is no fundamental difference between Nottingham and Yorkshire. Nottingham miners have even in the recent past elected left-wing leaders. But those left-wing leaders never worked in a systematic fashion to organise with the best activists among the rank and file once and for all to break the grip of the right-wing in Nottinghamshire.

One-third of the miners in Nottingham came out at the height of this strike. With different leadership the mass of the Nottingham miners would have stood shoulder to shoulder with miners nationally. The fight must now begin for that leadership.

A small Broad left has existed within the National Union of Mineworkers for many years, the Miners Forum. It is this body that helped to get Arthur Scargill elected as President of the NUM. Yet the mass of young miners in Nottingham and other coalfields have never heard of its existence. Membership has always been strictly limited. It has been made up of left-wing coalfield leaders with a few handpicked left leaders of different lodges and branches.

A mass national campaigning broad left within the NUM involving the widest possible layers of those who have fought in this struggle is now essential. It is needed above all in Nottingham. No praise is too high for those in Notts and other right wing areas who stayed loyal to the strike. They must now be mobilised in an NUM Broad Left.

Re-win Notts

We believe that if such a body had existed in Nottingham over the last few years, then at area level and in every pit, the fight would have been taken to the right wing. Their whole position would have been undermined. Left leaders from other coalfields should have gone into Nottinghamshire to add their experience and support to those leading the campaign to break the right. The left leaders, instead, were over sensitive to criticism that they were infringing the territorial rights of the local branches. Generally speaking, therefore, they stayed outside Nottinghamshire.

If this attitude had changed in the months leading up to the strike, if the right wing leaders had been put on the spot in mass meetings as part of a mass national campaign, Nottingham miners could have been prepared for action in this battle.

Once the strike had started the winning of support of Notts became vital. The length of the battle and the support from other workers depended upon the outcome. It is widely agreed now that lack of a clear lead led to certain tactical mistakes.

The younger miners of Yorkshire were determined to win the support of their fellow mineworkers in Nottingham. They simply assumed that the longstanding tradition of the miners and the wider labour movement of not crossing picket lines would be adhered to.

In Nottingham, however, and in other right-wing coalfields, the leaders found one way and then another to cloud the issues, once advising miners to cross picket lines, then calling for strike. This confusion added to doubt, uncertainty, frustration and anger.

A wall of bitterness grew between striking miners and those, particularly in Nottingham, still at work.

We believe that most of these problems could have been avoided if the leadership, particularly in the Yorkshire area, had sent out picketing teams in an orderly manner, discussing carefully with each group of pickets the need to go—armed with leaflets—to discuss in a fraternal and comradely fashion with their fellow workers, to speak with confidence to mass meetings and canteen meetings, to convince the Nottingham miners that their fight was that of the national union.

The early picketing failed to win solid support in Nottinghamshire. We then argued for a mass drive into Nottinghamshire by the national union.

The debate then began to rage: should there be a ballot? Traditionally, miners have always had ballots for national industrial action.

Ballot

The right-wing, who had broken and ignored ballots over the incentive bonus scheme, now became super-democrats.

Our attitude to these questions is: what tactics secure the greatest unity?

In the last months of 1983 and in January or February of last year a national campaign for a national strike would have won a majority in a ballot. The NUM lefts—wrongly we believe—lacked the confidence of a ballot victory because of previous setbacks and so decided upon an area-by-area "rolling strike" strategy.

The Monktonhall dispute, the spontaneous strike against disciplinary action in Yorkshire, the Staffordshire strike against the scab winding men and the solid support for the overtime ban were all symptoms of the mood that was significantly hardening nationally. With a proper, thorough campaign, a ballot before the action could have been successful.

Once the fight became entrenched, we argued for trying to build a majority in action. The mass of miners had already voted with their feet. The need was then to try and build and strengthen that unity in action, as rapidly and as energetically as possible, and then turn out swiftly to other workers.

But, once these methods had failed to win the majority of Notts miners for action, then in our opinion, a ballot should have been called. A national conference was held. A majority for a ballot was altered from 55% to 50%.

There was an air of expectation that a ballot was to take place. Had a ballot been organised then, as the later NACODS vote indicated—a massive majority would have been in favour. Notts miners—even if a majority in Notts had been against—at that stage undoubtedly would have joined the strike. The ballot was not called. Miners turned their attention to winning the strike, knowing their efforts would continually be undermined by the working Notts miners.

This strike has seen the radicalisation of whole communities. Within the NUM, the young lions—as they were dubbed—burst into this strike with incredible courage and energy. They and the youth around them in the pit villages are the vanguard of a social explosion of which the Tories are terrified. They have rekindled the very finest traditions of struggle and solidarity.

As long ago as June, The Times was to comment that ironically: "the dispute that some politicians hoped would break of the power of the NUM has actually created new cadres for the future". In the course of the next few years the youth, the vanguard of this strike, will move to the head of the union in the lodges/branches, the areas, and at national level. This battle, its lessons and bitter disappointments will have prepared the way for a new leadership and for more struggles, and victories.

Of equal importance and significance has been the activity of miners' wives and women generally in support of this strike. Their role has not been limited to the kitchen, important though this activity was to the life of the strike. Women's support groups have been active on the picket lines, speaking at meetings, public collections and every other aspect of the strike.

The isolation of women in the home has traditionally laid them open to the pressures of the media and manufactured 'public opinion'. They have also suffered the unrelieved pressure which any strike brings. When the rent can't be paid, the kids' pocket money dwindles, the money problems mount up and hardship bites. It generally tends to hit hardest and most constantly the women, whose day to day lives are most tied to those responsibilities.

The women of the mining communities have fought alongside their husbands, brothers, fathers and boyfriends, seeing the strike from a shared class viewpoint. They have become fighters and leaders. The NUM and the wider labour movement must ensure that they continue to play a full and active part within its ranks.

Miners and their families now have a deep political awareness forged in the heat of bitter struggle. Many thousands will turn to political activity and to the Labour Party.

They will work to recreate this party as an instrument to free the working class from the inhumane anarchy of capitalism. The NUM has been one of the foundation stones upon which the Labour Party rested.

Miners will never forget how this deep, abiding loyalty was repaid during this dispute by Neil Kinnock and the other Labour leaders.

Only once did Neil Kinnock find the time to visit a picket line. Rallies were organised to lift the spirits of the miners and prepare for the next stage of struggle. After negotiations had been broken off by the Coal Board, Neil Kinnock was too busy to attend. When the full weight of the law was being thrown against individual miners, he advised meek compliance with the capitalist courts and the decisions of Tory judges.

If the pioneers of the trade unions and the labour movement had taken that attitude, there would be no trade union movement or Labour Party! In Moscow, Kinnock even poured scorn on the idea of suffering among miners and their families. And, in the run-up to the TUC, he lined up with those working to block wide generalised industrial action in support of the miners.

Finally, at the end of this dispute, with an amnesty for sacked miners becoming such a burning issue, Kinnock and other Labour leaders lined up with the Tories against a general amnesty, giving credence to the idea that miners were violent criminals who deserved to be sacked and face a lifetime on the dole.

The role of these Labour leaders will never be forgotten or forgiven by miners. The rule book of the NUM contains the commitment: "To join with other organisations for the purpose of, and with a view to the complete abolition of capitalism". After the bitter experiences of the last twelve months miners will increasingly turn to the Labour Party to fight for a leadership that will carry the struggle for socialism through to a victorious conclusion.

[Photograph, p. 8, John Harris (IFL):] This famous picture from the battle at Orgreave coke works catches two major elements of the strike: the new violence of the police throughout the strike and a turning point for the mass picketting campaign

[Photograph, p. 10, John Harris (IFL):] The vote against an immediate return to work in Kent and Scotland despite the national decision nailed the media lie that miners were smashed and desperate to return to work.

← NCB - SERIOUS GEOLOGICAL CHANGES NOW AFFECT MANY COALFIELDS.A programme for the NUM →

Something wrong on this page?