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Dave Cotterill looks at the phenomenon of Russian nationalism and how Zhirinovsky is likely to feature in this The roots of Russian Nationalism asian nationalists demonstrate in Moscow. T IS MISTAKEN to think that Russia will converge smoothly on a Western model of ecomomic development". Dr John Gray, Oxford Um versity. Russia's inability to create the con- Eitioms under which capitalism can flourish has led movement.
to extreme political and social instability. A glance at the social statistics shows the horrors and nightmares that 'the free market' means. Fifteen million people, one tenth of the population, earn below starvation wages whilst one third are below the Russian nationalism • 5
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official poverty line. At the same time, the fat cat emerging capitalists are now 10.4 times richer than soe poorest ten per cent. So catastrophic is the situation that in the last three years life expectancy has decreased by three years, from 69.2 to 66 years of age.
Shock therapy for the economy has meant an absolute disaster for the vast bulk of the populaon fact. for the porer tion. An average family now spend between 60% and 70% of their income on food. For pensioners the figure is 83% and for those below the poverty line it is an incredible 90%. This is the economics of barbarism dressed up as a 'golden age' of capi- Such damning statistics have brought home to even the most short-sighted that Russia is teetering on the edge of a social explosion. As a result shock therapy has been put on the back burner. Yeltsin's advisors talk of a mixed economy, while Yeltsin says "our task is to find a reasonable balance between the pace of reforms and the social cost". Most of the proponents of fast-track reform have now been forced to resign, replaced by ex-Soviet managers who intend to proceed at a slower pace in handing over the big state industries to capitalist ownership. However, they remain essentially committed to the idea of a market economy This partial turnabout in the economic sphere is reflected more in the political arena where yesterday's villains have become today's heros. Bowing to the pressure of the newly elected parliament, Yetsin has been humbled by being forced to declare an amnesty for all the participants in the tempted 'coup' in October 1993. This amnesty Rutskoi, now released, has presidential ambitions. severely undermined Yeltsin, who is now being forced by the parliament to consider the idea of National Unity', involving all nine parliamentary parties and the trade unions.
Partly this is to prepare for the social shocks of increasing hyperinflation and the closing down of some of the large industrial enterprises. But also involved may be a strategy to isolate Zhirinovsky and his forces in the 6 • Russian nationalism 1 Liberal Democratic Party.
In the short term, the two dominant issues will be the economy and Russia's 'near abroad' - especially with 25 million Russians living outside the borders of the Russian Federation. And although Yeltsin has no real foreign policy he is forced to use bellicose statements that in the defence of these people he will 'use not words but deeds. At the same time US imperialism has been warned not to push for the incorporation of the former Eastern Europe into NATO. Instead Russia may agree to a partnership for peace", within which it is currently demanding that it should have big power status.
HIRINOVSKY'S SPECTACULAR ELEC- Z TION results have forced Yeltsin and his government ministers into a much more aggressive foreign policy. The pact signed with Belarus, which carried through economic re-union with Russia, has been taken as one sign of expanding Russian influence. In Nagorno-Karabakh Russia is attempting to broker an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. To exert pressure on Ukraine, the Russian government has questioned the status of the Crimean peninsular, which was ceded to Ukraine in 1954, and in the recent elections Russian nationalists won a big victory. Alarm has spread in the West, with intelligence experts now talking of a 'Greater Russia' carving out its spheres of influence in relation to the Baltic states and Eastern Europe. At this stage, however, Russia, because of economic and social problems, has no resources to launch an aggressive imperialist foreign policy.
However, for the domestic audience the drum of nationalism has to be banged. Economic crisis, combined with a feeling that Russia has been sold out to the big powers, and a disdain, if not open hatred, for the market, have all helped to fuel nationalist feelings. Previously Russia was regarded as a big power, now the International Monetary Fund is dictating its economic policy. Yeltsin may try to argue that 'people voted not for the nationalists but against poverty, but this tells only one side of the story.
Zhirinovsky's success came about because of the desperate poverty, because he seemed to defend the rights of Russians, and also stood for law and order. For fast-track capitalism is openly equated with the Mafia and criminal conspiracies, who are estimated to hold between $15bn and $25bn, half of which has been shipped abroad. Yet this is before mass unemployment and the emptying-out of the factories has really hit home. Production has fallen by 30% over the last two years and many workers, such as the miners, have not been paid for months. In fact many of the strikes now taking place are to demand payment
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wages. Producers are
y in a position where
cannot pay wages or
To alleviate this po-
Chernomyrdin, the
prime minister, is going to
allow the relaxation of
credit, the consequence of
which is likely to boost pro-
duction slightly but at the
expense of an annual infla-
tion rate of 2,000%.
Greater Russian chauvin-
ism and nationalism have
therefore grown against the
background of these events.
With no other pole of at-
traction, with so-called
communism discredited and
because of political naivety,
Zhirinovsky has been able
to gain temporary points of Yeltsin, increasingly bellicose.
support. Though the initial
illusions in the market have been shattered, the
workers' organisations are by and large not provid-
ing any other alternative
It is not at all accidental
attempted
"coup' in October
fascists and
extreme national
with one an-
other
Sories in the old
openly chau-
anti-semitic
mulle
Reflecting
party managed electi cember 1993
conscious
vote for
consisted of workers and
seduced by nationalism and
estone Russia's former glories. Others were attracted by anti-semitism. But there were also
ased workers who wanted to strike a blow at Yeltsin's fast-track reforms'.
N is progressive and one reactionary. Move-
ATIONALISM HAS TWO sides, one which
ments which begin around the right to
self-determination and the ending of oppression by a another nation can, under certain conditions, acquire a revolutionary class character. In other circumstances, nationalism can take on an utterly reactionary character. Reactionary nationalism disputes borders, claims lost' territories and reawakens old prejudices against whatever minority it can scapegoat.
When
the working class moves into struggle, ationalism tends to recede as unity becomes the main focus. Setbacks, defeats and demoralisation gremerally act to strengthen national divisions. To mutt across this threat the workers' movement needs
unite all workers in struggle, oppose all forms
mational oppression and defend the rights of all
minorities and all nations to self-determination. Given the current confusion amongst Russian workers and all sections of the population it is little wonder that nationalism has become a much more powerful force.
Defeats and
oralisation generally
act to strengthen
national divisions.
Such movements are not confined to Russia. Outside Russia, the new capitalist governments have based themselves on the nationalist sentiments of the non-Russian population. Each regime has used the tactic of diverting mounting anger over the economic situation against other nationalities or local minorities.
In the case of Ukraine, Kravchuk has banged the drum of Ukrainian nationalism and in doing so has taken a very big gamble. With a collapsing industry, galloping inflation, mass unemployment and unpaid wages, Russian nationalism may become a potent factor, especially with 12 million ethnic Russians living in Ukraine.
Zhirinovsky is an extreme expression of nationalism, who mixes all of the reactionary potions, including that of fascist demagogy. But it may well turn out that he is only a stalking horse for other nationalist candidates. Yeltsin himself has increasingly been forced to don the cloak of nationalism, but his long-term position seems to be untenable. Humbled by the parliament and with speculation mounting about his health and state of mind, it is
Russian nationalism 7
dem
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difficult to see how he can last for any great length of time. Yavlinsky, one of the more popular 'reform" politicians, summed up Yeltsin's position recently "he does not know what to do. There is no concept of how to go ahead in the economy or in society".
However, it would be a mistake to think that Zhirinovsky will immediately profit. On his release, Rutskoi openly stated that his presidential ambitions could provide a barrier to Zhirinovsky, which might explain why Zhirinovsky wanted Rutskoi pardoned but at the same time demanded that he be banned from political activity after his release. The problems of a dictatorial regime would be immense.
Moreover, rumours still abound about Thimnovsky being an agent of the KGB, and recent events indicate that plans are afoot to undermin his position. To begin with, two MPs from Liberal Democrats have denounced him as beime 'crazy, while in the constituency from which he was elected, the elections have been annulled. Fi nally, accusations are now flying about that Zhirinovsky paid for adverts on the TV with forged bank-notes. The talks about national unity may therefore, be aimed at marginalising Zhirinovsky and Yeltsin, allowing Rutskoi or another contender to take on the mantle of Russian nationalism. A FULLY-FLEDGED fascist movement is largely ruled out for the time being. Clas sically, such movements were based com mobilising the middle classes to batter and atomise the organisations of the working class. In Russia today there are no stable classes which are rooted in the process of production. The capitalist class is only just emerging, centred around the ex-Stalinist bureaucrats and the gangster elle. ments. Only a tiny minority have benefited from the market transition, whilst the vast bulk Thiwe in absolute poverty. As for the working class, thie illusions in the market combined with the daily struggle to simply survive, has meant that mo independent action has been taken by their cmganisations.
At this stage in Russia, the emergence of capitalism is not therefore threatened with a mass revolutionary movement which has as its goal a socialist revolution, as was the situation in Germany from 1918 to 1933 and Italy from 1919 to 1922. Finally, the experience of Hitler and the Nazis showed to the capitalist class on a world scale the dangers of handing power to a fascist madman. Unable to restrain the Nazis, German capitalism lost everything and found Germany di- 8 • Russian nationalism vided.
The very fact that Yeltsin was not able to go down the road of an authoritarian regime after October's attempted coup" says a lot about the relationship of class forces. Despite the absence of genuine independent workers" organisations, Yeltsin had to assume a "democratic" face, otherwise he would have faced a massive backlash from the working class, milo would have seem a move to as a mesom m the political authoritariamism forms of Stalinism The international experience off fast and neofascist organisations is instructive, lim France, Le Plem and the FN have seen their electiomall support undermined, partly by the unity gemeated in the mement strike action of the working class but also because the right wing government of Balladur has stolem their clothes.
lim Italy, the fascist MSI was at pains to proclaim in the recent elections that it was mot fascist umd stood for democracy. Recognising that talk of am authoritarian one-party state would cut across heir support, they disowned their past and even wemt as far as changing their name. In Germany une Republikaners, who are not an openly fascist organisation and distance themselves from the neo- Nazis, have lost some ground to the CDU's coalition partner, the CSU, which has also adopted he tactic of stealing parts of the far-right's promime.
In the not too distant future, a coup or dictatofiall rule may be attempted in Russia, perhaps in he name of 'national unity'. If so, it may use the e of corruption and the criminal activities of he gangsters as an excuse and would adopt natomalist and radical phraseology although, given Zhirinovsky's instability, it is unlikely that he would gain the backing of the military. The problems of a dictatorial regime would be mense. Public order could not easily be restored when the army and police are so divided and when the regional leaders all guard their autonomy. The imposition of dictatorship could over time radicalise workers and also inflame the national tensions. Zhirinovsky, if he came to power, would be faced with all of these problems. This raises the question: who would he base himself on? Unlike Hitler, he has no armed bands to lean on, nor a stable class basis to build them on. With what programme would he mobilise the middle layers of society, who face precisely the same problems as those faced by the working class? His foreign policy may be to plant Russian boots on the sands of the Indian ocean, but how effectively could this be carried out given the problems amongst Russia's neighbours and the difficulties with the ranks of the armed Given today's world situation and the general trend towards 'democracy, an openly fascist party cannot hope to build support at the present time. This too applies to Zhirinovsky and the current situation in Russia.
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