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Under the shadow EFORE THE EYES of Israeli soldiers, fanatical settler Baruch Goldstein sprayed 110 bullets into Palestinians praying in the Hebron mosque, murdering thirty-nine. The blood that flowed across the mosque floor seemed light years away from the ceremony that greeted the famous handshake of Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawns last September.
Palestinian outrage boiled over into mass protests in the occupied territories, but also into the biggest demonstrations since 1976 by Israeli Palestinians. Riots spread through Jaffa, a Palestinian suburb of Tel Aviv, Haifa and the Galilee. There was a three-day general strike on both sides of the green line. There were mass protests in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan.
of Hebron The Israeli government portrayed the massacre as the actions of a single Tomatic. However, it has been the Zionist Israeli capitalist class that has encouraged, financed and armed the settlers since the formation of the Ismaelli state im 1948. Puny were taken in response to the massacre measures - five settlers detained, a further twenty disarmed, and some restrictions placed on their mowement. A thousand Palestinian political prisomers are also to be released.
Despite their pious condemnation, the Israeli government put two million Palestiniams under curfew. At least twenty Palestinians were killed in the occupied territories in the following days while, for the first time, a Bedouin Arab was shot dead inside Israel. So what will happen now? Does the massacre mean the end of the negotiations between the Israeli government, the PLO, and the other Arab states? S EPTEMBER'S PEACE ACCORD represented an important change in the situation in the Middle East. Previously, any agreement between Israel and the PLO have appeared unthinkable. Imperialism d its client state, Israel, have never been prenamed to concede genuine Palestinian national selffemmination. They feared that the consequences of an independent Palestinian state, a revolutionary upsurge amongst the Palestinians looking to the Stalinist bloc for support, would have so destabilised the region that their fundamental strategic interests would have been threatened, not least among them, the supply of oil. The collapse of Stalinism, therefore, had a huge effect on relations in the Middle East. In this power vacuum, some regimes previously hostile to imperialism were forced into the orbit of the West to secure their stability. The West's price was support for the peace accord.
by Kevin Simpson Baruch Goldstein.
Hebron massacre 9 •
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US imperialism's experience in the Gulf war, despite its victory, demonstrated the extreme instability in the region, exacerbated by the war itself. The growth of radical Islamic fundamentalism across the region was viewed with alarm by both Western imperialism and the Israeli capitalist class. US imperialism saw a regional political settlement as a way of cutting across this development, as well as reducing its large political and financial commitments to the region, especially to Israel and Egypt. They aimed to split the Palestinian masses by using the PLO leadership to implement a deal.
International and regional political factors forced the Zionist Israeli ruling class into signing a provisional agreement with the PLO. They were aware that since the Gulf war, US imperialism was looking for other regimes to rest on in the region. Aid and blanket support from the US for their policies of brutal repression of the Palestinians was no longer guaranteed.
This agreement, moreover, would not have beem possible without the intifada. This six-year long uprising brought about a realisation among wide layers of Israeli society that the Palestinians' aspi rations cannot be crushed militarily. This led in turn to a questioning of the idea of a greates Israel' and the strategic reasoning for holding an to the Gaza strip. The mood of uncertainty abou Israeli state crack-down after massacre. 10 • Hebron massacre the future has been exacerbated by a certain war weariness, emphasised by the Gulf war, and the long-term difficulties of the Israeli economy, with the various Zionist capitalist governments no longer able to guarantee health care, education and job security for the Israeli working class. 22 The Israeli ruling class regard the PLO leadership as the lesser evil'.
The growth of radical Islamic fundamentalism and rejectionist secular groups in the occupied territories, at the expense of the PLO leadership, larmed the Israeli ruling class. The Israeli ruling ass now regard the PLO leadership as the lesser evil" and saw the agreement as a way of beheading intifada and isolating the rejectionist groups. They used the weakness of the PLO leadership to grant concessions small enough not to provoke a general revolt among Israeli Jews, but with enough promises of future concessions for the Palestinians to ensure that Arafat could find points of support within the territories.
The peace accord gives limited aspects of selfrule in parts of the occupied territories, with the promise of future status to be negotiated. The Palestinian self-governing authority (SGA) will consist of an area in Gaza and the West Bank city of Jericho. It will be responsible for development, education, social services and collection of taxes. A new Palestinian Police Force (PPF) will be set up to guarantee public order and internal security. The questions of Jerusalem, settlements, security arrangements, and borders, were all delayed until megotiations on permanent status for the Palestinlian self-governing authority begin. Arafat and the PLO signed the agreement because they were desperate for their political survival. Arafat's previous comment on a similar deal offered by the Israelis was that it gave *nothing more than a Palestinian Bantustan". Yet, while these concessions do not come anywhere near to realising Palestinian national liberation, with, for example, Palestinian refugees from 1948 excluded from the agreement, the peace accord was initially greeted with euphoria on both sides of the national divide.
Israeli workers and youth saw the agreement as the first step to a lasting peace in the region. The constant threat of war and the continuing intifada appeared to have been lifted. Even among Israeli Jews who questioned giving land for peace, , the feeling is that if this is done in conjunction with a lasting peace then the 'problems' in the occupied territories will have to be dealt with by the Pales-
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ball
and
aS ed
amian leadership. Amongst Palestinians the initial euphoria quite quickly changed to a feeling of 'give it a chance and we will see what it brings' among the majority, especially an older layer tired after six years of the intifada.
Subsequent negotiations resulted in further concessions by the PLO leadership. The Israeli government has secured final responsibility for external security at the borders, being able to bar Palestinians from entering Gaza. The area conceded around Jericho is only 55sq km. In Gaza, the Israeli army will be solely responsible for areas around the settlements and the roads from the settlements into Israel. There will be a security buffer zone between the SGA and the settlements in Gaza with joint control' for both Israelis and Palestinians.
VEN BEFORE THE Hebron massacre, the
PLU leadership was becoming increasingly
isolated. There was a growing feeling that
nothing had changed: 54 Palestinians and 23 Israelis have been killed, reactionary settlers continued to carry out attacks on unarmed Palestinians, while the withdrawal date for the Israeli army was pushed further back. From the beginning there was a significant layer mainly of Palestinian
RABIN
youth, the most active in the intifada, who opposed the agreement. They saw the PLO leadership as selling out the struggle and predicted that the PPF will be their new repressors, suppressing opposition to the agreement and to the undemocratic rule of Arafat. But even in exile there were growing queslions about the peace agreement.
In the Lebanon, 76 out of 77 PLO military ficers came out against the agreement. Only 12
alestinian leaders out of 18 regularly attend the LO executive meetings in Tunis. In January a dielegation presented a petition signed by 100 lead-
ing Palestinians criticising Arafat's undemocratic approach and croneyism in appointments to the new administration. Six Arafat loyalists resigned.
The Hebron massacre brought this accumulated tension to the surface. It pushed those Palestinians who retained hopes for the negotiations into opposition. The PLO's reaction to the massacre was muted at first. But when they saw Palestinian demonstrations in the Lebanon blaming Arafat for the massacre, they called for a UN presence in the territories. Even then their response was cynical. Yasser Abbed-Rabbo commented: "We are looking for the resumption of peace talks. But we have our own public opinion which demands a minimum requirement for the security of the Palestinians"
The Israeli ruling class's response to the massacre reveals the splits and divisions which have surfaced since the start of negotiations. They are in unchartered territory. Previously there was a relatively uniform attitude towards the Palestinians: occupation, brutal repression, and no concessions. The granting of concessions, however small, has revealed differences as to how to proceed, epitomised in the split between Rabin and foreign minister, Peres. Rabin wants to make as few concessions as possible; Peres, representing a more far-sighted section of the ruling class. is pre-
pared to go further. Rabin recently received a delegation of senior generals unhappy that Peres had given away too much in talks in Cairo.
Pressure has increased on Rabin since the massacre.
Many Israeli Jews, horrified by the massacre, blamed the government for not taking more decisive action against the set- 1aus Tha mananas has ananhad
tlers. The massacre has pushed
some Israeli Jews to the left. At
a Peace Now demonstration on
March 5, there were calls for
immediate withdrawal from the
occupied territories and the clo-
sure of the settlements. For the
first time several thousand Is-
raeli Palestinians attended this
mainly Israeli Jewish demon-
stration. Reflecting a feeling
from below, the press has carried articles pointing out that the security services knew Goldstein was a danger but did nothing. They have also graphically showed the brutal Israeli police response to Palestinian demonstrations inside Israel, and raised wider questions about the social conditions of Palestinians inside the green line.
Rabin was forced in cabinet discussions to concede a supreme court inquiry (broadcast live on Israeli TV) and the possibility of an unarmed international presence in the occupied territories. There has been speculation that he may be re-
HEBRON
massacre 11
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placed by Peres.
Rabin therefore may be forced to go further than he wishes to get negotiations going again. He may propose the closure of the Jewish enclave in Hebron town centre and further restrictions on reactionary settlers. However, revenge attacks by Palestinians could change the present atmosphere within Israel for further concessions.
Despite the mass mobilisation of Palestinians in Israel/Palestine against the massacre, therefore, is likely that negotiations will be restarted. Both the Israeli ruling class and the PLO leadership fear the alternative. Neither can afford a breakdown in the peace process.
were grown.
abou
Hebron ing
there
questions
the peace agreement.
The next few months will probably see inter diplomatic activity where negotiations appear make headway, punctuated by huge explosions protest by the Palestinian people, angry at the la of progress towards genuine national liberatic This will not only be directed against the Isra state - but against the new Palestinian administr tion. The new self-governing authority will pushed at times to the brink of civil war. As result of the massacre, there will be further gru in support for radical Islamic fundamentalism rejectionist secular groups such as the DFLP PFLP. The PLO leadership will veer between pression and attempts to split these groups, enticing some into the administration with prom ises of financial and political influence.
That is why they have been desperate international aid for the new administratil gain points of support among the Palestinian lation and undercut the rejectionist groups. S international aid will materialise and even amounts will have an effect. But the decades struggle of the Palestinian masses has left ing desire for national liberation. Improve housing, jobs and education, in and of the will only encourage demands for what the tions cannot lead to: genuine social an liberation for the Palestinian people. diction will lead to further convulsions a in the future.
HILE FURTHER CONCESSIONS are
W likely by the Israeli state, there are
huge obstacles that represent potential
minefields for the negotiators. The question of the settlements, highlighted by the massacre, is one of these.
12 • Hebron
Approximately 116,000 settlers live on the
West Bank and the Golan. The housing minister, Ben Blizer, presenting a shift in the Zionist Israeli ruling class's position, recently said that
settlements had been built for security reasons
and not idenlogical ones. If security needs were
answered (presumably a peace settlement with
• "painful decisions pulld have to be
Attempts to mone
is of sentlers back
no Israel could
might-wing campaign, playing om
Enlagical fears
Jews have for
Bad Hate before
mation of this, Ratin
my decision is taken on the Golam theme will be
i mational referendum. At the same time, moves
vill be made to try and split the settlens by offer-
ng financial inducements to move. Recent press
aparts spoke of a foreign ministry working paper
musing $300,000 per family, at a total cost of
lom. Although officially denied, this lead to 1,000
alls to the ministry in one day from settlers who
ramted to move.
There are further concessions that the Israeli
ling class can make. The periodic release of the
emaining 11,000 Palestinian prisoners can kick-
tart negotiations when necessary. Concessions will
robably be made on water rights and tarrifs on
gricultural produce from the occupied territories.
But even if the peace negotiations do go further
hey will not solve the fundamental contradictions
• the region. In order to win the struggle for
uational liberation and socialism, the Palestinian
eople face the task of defeating the Israeli state.
To do this the Jewish workers have to be split
way from support for the present Zionist state
f Israel or, at the very least, neutralised. The mplacable struggle of the Palestinian people for their liberation will clearly demonstrate to the Israeli Jewish working class that they will never have peace and security if genuine Palestinian national liberation is not won. Their experience in the years ahead that Israeli capitalism can no longer guarantee the living standards of the past will also lead them to question what the future holds. An approach from the Palestinian masses that recognises the genuine fears of Israeli Jews for their security, by giving them an alternative of a joint struggle to overthrow the Israeli Zionist state, the Arab dictatorial regimes, and the influence of imperialism in the region, is therefore vital. Only this can guarantee the right of the Israeli nation to self-determination, alongside a Palestinian state, within a socialist federation of the Middle East.
Imperialism and its client states are responsible for the unending carnage in the Middle East. Fucure events will show that only the working class and peasant masses are capable of breaking the cycle of violence and using the human and material resources of the region to their full potential, banishing for ever war, poverty and starvation.
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