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Will Benazir survive?
Farooq Tariq, publisher of Mazdoor Jeddojuhd (Workers' Struggle), looks at the prospects ahead for Pakistan Tber of Paro Laghas to HE ELECTION LAST Octopresident of Pakistan, three weeks after Benazir Bhutto became prime minister, saw shame prices rise on the Karachi and Lahore stock exchanges. The chances of 'democracy" surviving had, it seemed, been boosted. During the previous five years, the presidency's dictatorial powers had been used to memowe three prime ministers. The fact that the new president, foremy a chief organiser of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), was from the same party as the prime minister, was hailed by the capiwhich predicted a full five-year term for Benazir. But how strong is Benazir's government, her second of the last four years? Will she comfive-year plete her term to become only the second premier, after her father, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, to do so? What is the present relationship between the PPP and the working class, 25 years after its formation? What are the perspectives for Pakistan's future?
Benazir's marginal victory in the October 1993 elections raised doubts as to whether she would be able to take office once more. But the army and state bureaucwere determined to bring into power, so most of the regional and small parties were persuaded to back her. Strangely, the same army and bureaucracy were responsible for removing her from power only 39 months before. So why were they so keen now?
The previous eight months of political crisis had showed that under Benazir Bhutto.
the PPP was becoming more and more a 'pro-establishment party. Moving away from its original ideology and programme, it made all sorts of unholy alliances and unprincipled decisions to come into power. In April 1993, Benazir supported the dictatorial presidential measures that re- Pakistan • 13
[page 15]
moved the then prime minister
Nawaz Sharif. She took impor-
tant ministries in the caretaker
government, although she herself
had been dismissed in August
1990 by the same presidential
powers. In July 1993, she called
off a Long March', a mass pro-
test mobilisation, on the
instructions of Abdul Waheed
Kakar, the military chief in Paki-
stan, proudly telling the press
that it was the desire of the gen-
eral.
When new elections were
called for October after the
forced resignation of Nawaz and
president Ghulam Ishaq Khan,
she nominated feudals and capi-
talists to contest the elections on
the PPP's behalf. PPP activists
could not think even of contesting for PPP election 'tickets' , as
the minimum fee for submitting
an application was Rs20,000 (£500). Even the capitalist Muslim League nomination fees were half that amount.
Her election programme was not attractive to the masses. It promised to cut the budget deficit and to continue the privatisation programme of the previous government, albeit 'clean' privatisation - that is, without the massive corruption involved in the state sell-off so far.
The establishment however was keen to bring Benazir into power because Nawaz was expanding the budget deficit like fire. His grandiose projects, like the Lahore to Peshawar motorway, the bullet train and the yellow cab scheme, were simply based on budget deficits. Internationally he was seen as a corrupt politician, which was absolutely true. In fact, Nawaz wanted to become another Bhutto, not based on social reforms• and promises of socialism, but on economic developmental demagogy. He wanted Pakistan to become another Korea, when in reality Pakistan is becoming more of an Ethiopia. He opened the Pakistani market to international finance gangsters but his economic concessions did not bring in substantial investmen His
• Pakistan
policy to buy most of the 35,000 yellow cabs from Korea brought him into conflict with other international car companies. His arrogant refusal to devalue the rupee was a point of conflict with the World Bank and IMF.
AWAZ WON THE 1990
elections with the biggest
majority any capitalist
party had ever achieved. He had
a majority in the Senate, the Na-
tional Assembly, all the
Provincial Assemblies, and on
district and local councils over
the country. But his economic ad-
venture had a disastrous effect
on the masses. During his time
in power, wages did not rise, al-
though prices of most consumer
goods rose by 80%. He also dis-
appointed the capitalists
themselves as they recognised
that his main achievement was to develop his own fortune. In
1980 he owned one factory; by
1993 his Itifaq group owned over 30 large factories.
It was only Benazir's absolute refusal to offer any incentive to the masses during the election campaign that allowed Nawaz to increase his support in the urban areas. Nawaz's Muslim League got 41% of the votes compared to Benazir's 38%, on a turnout of 40%, 3% less than the 1990 elections.
Benazir was able to form a government however with the help of the small and regional parties. A breakaway group of the Muslim League now holds the balance of power in the centre and Punjab. The Muslim League Chatha group and PPP have formed the Pakistan Democratic Front (the PPP did not put up candidates where the Chatha League was standing). Nawaz's former electoral allies, the Muslim fundamentalist 'Pakistan Islamic Front', , stood independently. But the elections were a crushing defeat for the three Muslim fundamentalist groups. In total they got just 3.5% of the vote and only nine seats in the 240 seat national assembly.
Benazir has come into power against a background of severe
economic and social crises. Annual GDP growth in the 1990s has gone into reverse gear, and is now at 5%, down from 7% in 1991. Last year the budget deficit went up to 18lbn rupees, 70% of the total budget. Foreign debt is $22bn,
$8bn in 1982. US aid has
em stopped since 1990
a Congressional bam
aid to nuclear-bui
Foreign remittances
to less than $1bn,
of $3bn a year. To make
ers worse, cotton production
slumped, when 70% of
portsrest on cotton produ
Benazir's
government
nt
remains
nerable
all sorts of
to
of
wessures.
Benam to clear up the
economic
by the
Nawaz
a capitalist basis
meducing the budget
ang expenditure
welfare, currenting
Out of 1992-93
budget of Rs300bm
went to re-
loans and interest
Imm to the army.
Benazir
mittention of attacking
mditure.
The mild Bank has imposed
structural adjustm
means deva cultural secto pesticides equipment have watisation of 107 imstitutions from uld only bring Rst micine. - the exchequer, whe eme hoping for at least All the myths that sation would put Pakis ck onto the road of progress have been exploded. It Is seen as handing over state
[page 16]
Алand In DeS.
ign ESto migh On red.
to of PS.
tate assets to the friends and rela- nations or minorities. Even tives of top politicians. One of the biggest scandals has been the acquistion of massive bank loans for politicians and their friends businesses loans which are treated as nonrepayable grants. The caretaker government of Moen Qureshi had published a list of 5,000 bank defaulters, most of them from the PPP and Muslim League.
The election commission barred some from contesting the elections, but these defaulters simply substituted their brothers and sons - it was all kept in the family. All the medieval symptoms of a corrupt society are found here. The population is split on religious, linguistic and communalistic lines. The national question in Sind, Frontier and Baluchistan has taken several twists and turns and made the situation more complicated. Basically, none of the fundamental problems of the masses have been solved and there is no hope that on capitalist basis there is any way forward.
which, power on a stable basis.
Consequently, tries Govor satisfy the the minimum autonomy conceded to Kashmir would intensify demands for autonomy or independence in Assam, Punjab, Mizoram, Tamil Nadu and other states in India, and in Sind and Baluchistan in Pakistan. Any agreement on Kashmir would also give an excuse to Muslim fundamentalist forces in Pakistan and Hindu fundamentalists in India to exploit the situation. The failure to solve the basic problems of the masses in urban Zia and Zulfiqar Bhutto. A 1977 situation could happen. and rural areas will raise tensions. Most small traders and a big section of capitalists still support Nawaz. The 1977 situation could be repeated, when the reactionary forces launched a massive agitiation and the Bhutto government was overthrown by a military general, Zia al-Haq. The Nawaz Muslim and the fundamentalist League Pakistan Islamic Front could again join hands and engage in demagogy.
anti-imperialist Benazir's move towards a more pro-US position would encourage such a development.
It is far from certain then that Benazir will complete a fiveyear term. If there is mass urban agitation, the military could again step in. But this is not on the agenda immediately. Benazir probably has a year or two before such a crisis point is reached.
In order to press on with privatisation, Benazir has not taken a breath before smashing the trade union rights of 150,000 railway workers. The railway unions were banned on the grounds that the railways are vital to Pakistan's military defence! These attacks on an organised section of the working class will not help Benazir's government to prolong its period in power. There is no hope that Benazir Will move towards left policies. The PPP of the 1970s is nowhere to be seen. The word 'socialism' is considered an abuse for most of the PPP's wealthy leaders. The PPP is losing its support among the advanced strata of the working class more rapidly than at any other time. The main beneficiary at present is the Muslim League, because there is no other alternative. Now some trade union leaders are discussing the formation of a new workers' party. But such a call cannot be accepted as a substitute for a fighting leadership in the trade unions. Trade unions have played a decisive role in defending the workers from the present attacks by the PPP government. Victories in this struggle would open the way to the real possibility of winning advanced workers, and then wider layers, for the creation of a genuine workers' party in Pakistan.
Pakistan • 15
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